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They are [portrayed as] “monsters” and “beasts” . . . [b]ut sexual
predators—and our powerful reaction to them—are doing
another form of damage as well. We have come to think of these
men as archetypical sex offenders and have shaped our public
policy responses as if all sex offenders fit this mold. We are blind
to the true nature of sexual violence in our society, which is far
different from what we think it is . . . . [S]exual predators
represent but a small fraction—a thin sliver—of the sexual
1
criminals in our country.
2
– Eric Janus
The Court must emphasize that politics or political pressures
cannot trump the fundamental rights of Class Members who,
pursuant to state law, have been civilly committed to receive
1.

ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND
2 (2006).
2. Eric Janus is a member of the Minnesota Sex Offender Civil
Commitment Advisory Task Force.

THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE

11. Woolman_FF4 (1363-1433) (Do Not Delete)

2016]

6/24/2016 11:29 AM

GOING AGAINST THE GRAIN

1365

treatment. The Constitution protects individual rights even when
they are unpopular. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor sagely
observed, “[a] nation’s success or failure in achieving democracy
is judged in part by how well it responds to those at the bottom
3
and the margins of the social order.”
– Judge Donovan W. Frank
I.

INTRODUCTION

The case of Karsjens v. Jesson has brought much needed
attention to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). The
MSOP, a deeply troubling program set up under Minnesota’s Sex
4
Offender and Civil Commitment and Treatment Act (MCTA), has
5
expanded at unprecedented rates since its creation in 1994. Civil
commitment is a scheme of involuntary commitment for the
purpose of treating an underlying mental illness in order to ensure
6
public safety. Most sex offenders are civilly committed to the
MSOP for an indeterminate period of time after they serve their
7
prison sentence. The MSOP consists of high security facilities,
designed as prisons, as well as one less-restrictive facility for patients
8
who have progressed through treatment.
Sexual predator civil commitments address only a small sliver
9
of the sexual violence problem in our society —and at a staggering
3. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1174 (D. Minn. 2015) (quoting
Sandra Day O’Connor et al., The Third Annual William French Smith Memorial
Lecture: A Conversation with Retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 63,
65 (2009)).
4. MINN. STAT. § 253D (2014 & Supp. 2015).
5. Infra Section II.B.1; see, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, MINN. DEP’T HUM.
SERVS. [hereinafter MSOP FAQs], http://mn.gov/dhs/people-we-serve/adults
/services/sex-offender-treatment/faqs.jsp (last updated Mar. 15, 2016 3:13 PM).
6. BRIAN STETTIN ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., MENTAL HEALTH
COMMITMENT LAWS: A SURVEY OF THE STATES 5 (2014), http://tacreports.org
/storage/documents/2014-state-survey-abridged.pdf.
7. CIVIL COMMITMENT TRAINING RES. CTR., SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT
FACT SHEET 2 (2010), http://mn.gov/omhdd/assets/sex-offender-cc-fact-sheet
-2010_tcm23-27594.pdf.
8. Cynthia A. Frezzo, Treatment Under Razor Wire: Conditions of Confinement at
the Moose Lake Sex Offender Treatment Facility, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 653, 674 (2015).
9. In 2005, the most recent data available, 61,000 children and adults in
Minnesota were sexually assaulted. During this same period of time, one in five
women reported she had been raped in her lifetime and between eighty and
ninety percent of those rapes were committed by someone the survivor knew.
Sexual Violence, MINN. DEP’T HEALTH, http://www.health.state.mn.us/injury/topic
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cost of $120,000 per year per individual housed at the MSOP.
Regardless, Minnesota’s three branches of government are
unwilling to address the program’s constitutional concerns:
Despite the Federal Court’s admonishment to state
leadership to take immediate action to correct course, all
three branches of Minnesota’s state government remain
in paralysis. The last two governors have placed
moratoriums on administrative releases from MSOP, and
the state courts have repeatedly ignored opportunities to
step-up judicial oversight . . . . [T]wo legislative sessions
11
have passed without enacting necessary reforms.
The inability or unwillingness of Minnesota’s government to
make changes, despite the U.S. District Court for the District of
Minnesota’s directives, exemplifies the challenge of reforming a
12
state system that has spiraled dangerously out of control. Part of
the problem is due to societal fears and political pressure, which
renders Minnesota’s government powerless to enact needed
13
changes.
The Karsjens case presents an opportunity to
meaningfully reform this draconian system in Minnesota for the
14
betterment of victims, patients, and communities.
This comment begins with a brief overview of some of the
underlying theories at play in this case and why it is so important
for both individuals and our justice system that civil commitment
programs conform to their purported purpose to treat and
15
rehabilitate. Next, it discusses the social considerations at play in
the case, as well as a historical discussion of the rise in popularity of
16
sex offender civil commitment nationwide and in Minnesota.
Then, it provides some context to help understand the MSOP—a
description of the political climate at the time of its creation,

/svp/sviolence.cfm#scope (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
10. The annual budget for the MSOP for fiscal year 2016 is $83.7 million.
MSOP FAQs, supra note 5 (click on “What is the total operating cost of the sex
offender treatment program?”).
11. Jon Brandt & David S. Prescott, The Minnesota Sex Offender Program: Federal
Intervention Part 1—The Challenges, SEXUAL ABUSE (Feb. 1, 2015), http://
sajrt.blogspot.com/2015/02/the-minnesota-sex-offender-program.html.
12. See Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (D. Minn. 2015), appeal
docketed, No. 15-3485 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 2015).
13. Infra Section III.A.
14. Infra Part V.
15. Infra Section II.A.1.
16. Infra Section II.A.2.
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information about demographics and current policies, and a
comparison with other states’ sex offender civil commitment
17
(SOCC) programs. Then, it explores the background of the
Karsjens litigation, Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ arguments, Judge
Donovan Frank’s holding, and the aftermath of the court’s
18
decision. Finally, it discusses the next challenge in this case: to
provide and implement an effective plan for reform after such a
19
long period of dysfunction.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to effectively understand how Minnesota got to this
point in its civil commitment of sex offenders, it is important to
explore the background of the constitutional considerations and
societal concerns surrounding the theories of civil commitment
and criminal punishment. Also important is a consideration of the
rise of civil commitment popularity—in Minnesota and in other
states in the nation.
A.

Theories of Civil Commitment Versus Criminal Punishment

Civil commitment is an area where constitutional
considerations of individual liberties frequently collide with societal
outrage and political pressure. A central goal of SOCC is to protect
public safety by removing from society individuals who have been
determined to be sexually dangerous until they have been
sufficiently rehabilitated. One problem with SOCC programs, as
seen in Karsjens, is the ultimate goal of protecting the public
frequently supersedes individuals’ rights to effective rehabilitation
and a meaningful opportunity for successful treatment.
1.

Constitutional Considerations

Judge Frank establishes one important tenant for any SOCC—
that it must not be punishment. He explains that “while
incapacitation is a goal common to both the criminal and civil
systems of confinement, retribution and general deterrence are
20
reserved for the criminal system alone.” Civil commitment
17.
18.
19.
20.

Infra Part III.
Infra Part IV.
Infra Part V.
Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1143 (D. Minn. 2015) (quoting
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programs should be therapeutic—a place where individuals
rehabilitate constructively with sustainable progress towards an
21
independent and self-reliant way of life. Judge Frank found that
“the MSOP has developed into indefinite and lifetime detention.
Since the program’s inception in 1994, no committed individual
has ever been fully discharged from the MSOP, and only three
committed individuals have ever been provisionally discharged
22
from the MSOP.” Further distinguishing civil commitment and
criminal punishment, Judge Frank found the following:
[W]here, notwithstanding a “civil label,” a statutory
scheme “is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to
negate the State’s intention to deem it ‘civil,’” a court will
reject a legislature’s “manifest intent” to create a civil
proceeding . . . . Moreover, “[i]f the object or purpose” of
a civil commitment law is to provide treatment, “but the
treatment provisions were adopted as a sham or mere
pretext,” such a scheme would indicate “the forbidden
23
purpose to punish.”
Civil commitment systems are constitutionally excluded from
24
punishing individuals. In our justice system, only criminal
25
convictions can lead to punishment. John Rawls, among others,
provided a reflection on two distinct justifications for
26
punishment—the retributive view and the utilitarian view. His
retributive view is that “punishment is justified on the grounds that
27
wrongdoing merits punishment.” He states, “It is morally fitting
that a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his
28
wrongdoing.” Therefore, punishment follows guilt and the
29
severity of punishment depends on the evil of the crime.
Rehabilitation is “the process of helping a person to readapt to
30
society or to restore someone to a former position or rank.”

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring)), appeal
docketed, No. 15-3485 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 2015) .
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1147.
23. Id. at 1168 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361).
24. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373.
25. See generally John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 6–7 (1955).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 4.
28. Id. at 4–5.
29. Id. at 5.
30. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRISONS & CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 831 (Mary F.
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Rehabilitationas a stated goalis largely absent from the
31
sentencing phase of the United States criminal justice system.
Funding for programs to rehabilitate within prisons has been
decreased. State criminal statutes and sentencing guidelines use
retribution in some form as their foundational principle so that a
person’s criminal history and the severity of his or her crime
32
determine his or her criminal sanction. While rehabilitation has
lost popular and political support in the criminal justice system, it is
33
a critical endeavor of a civil commitment system.
In states like Minnesota, where a theory of limiting
34
retributivism—or modified just deserts drives our criminal
35
sentencing guidelines —offenders know the length of time they
36
will be incapacitated for the commission of their crime.
Bosworth ed., 2005). See generally Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, A More
Perfect System: Twenty-Five Years of Guidelines Sentencing Reform Purposes, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 67, 70–71 (2005) (discussing rehabilitation and sentencing in the criminal
justice system).
31. See Frase, supra note 30, at 70–71; see also Michael Rothfield, As Rehab
Programs Are Cut, Prisons Do Less to Keep Inmates From Returning, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17,
2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/17/local/me-rehab17
(stating
California approved to cut $250 million a year from prison rehabilitation services
at a time they were “most needed”).
32. See Frase, supra note 30, at 77–78 (“[I]n practice, modern systems of law
enforcement and punishment always function according to a limiting retributive
model under which most offenders, in return for their cooperation, receive less
severe sanctions than the maximum they deserve.”).
33. See generally, e.g., Eric Janus, Sexually Violent Predator Laws: Psychiatry in
Service to a Morally Dubious Enterprise, 364 MED. CRIME & PUNISHMENT 50 (2004)
(discussing the political implications of the use of psychiatry in sexually violent
predator laws).
34. See Frase, supra note 30, at 76 & n.22 (citing NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 161, 182–87, 196–200 (1982)); MINN. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMM’N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 9 (1980) (adopting modified just
deserts approach); RICHARD S. FRASE, LIMITING RETRIBUTIVISM, IN THE FUTURE OF
IMPRISONMENT 83, 90–104 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004) (discussing widespread
support for basic elements of limiting retributivism); Richard S. Frase, Sentencing
Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST. 363, 365–78 (1997) (summarizing
Morris’ theory of punishment and Minnesota’s approach). See generally Janus, supra
note 33, at 50.
35. Frase, supra note 30, at 78; Janus, supra note 33, at 50; see Frase, supra
note 30, at 76 (“Under this widely endorsed and adopted model, the offender’s
desert defines a range of morally justified punishments, setting upper and lower
limits on the severity of penalties that may fairly be imposed on a given
offender.”).
36. Frase, supra note 30, at 76; see id. at 73 (“[T]he limiting (negative) version
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Minnesota’s switch in the early 1980s to determinate sentencing
meant, among many things, that offenders knowon the day of
their sentencingthe exact amount of time they will serve in
38
prison.
In a well-functioning civil commitment system, some
39
individuals may never be released. But the focus should still be on
rehabilitation for the duration of a person’s incapacitation in a civil
system so that the people housed within the system and employees
working at the system understand that it is legitimate—and not a
40
pretext for continued punishment. A central problem with the
MSOP is that because no individual has ever been fully released, no
41
one detained within it believes that they will ever get out. This
sense of uncertainty and the hopelessness felt by those at the
MSOP, combined with the lack of release, is punitive—in some
42
ways worse than prison.
Civil commitment systems in many states struggle to conform
43
to their proper purpose—to treat and rehabilitate. One major
difference between criminal justice systems and civil commitment
systems is that a criminal system focuses on past behavior and the
44
punishment for a past wrong. We understand we cannot punish
dangerousness; we cannot apply criminal sanctions based on future
45
46
dangerousness. To do so is unconstitutional.
Therefore,

of retributive theory merely sets outer limits on punishment, defining a range of
permissible severity for any given case.”).
37. See Janus, supra note 33, at 50.
38. Offenders have a due process right to their release date from prison. See
Carrillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 773 (Minn. 2005).
39. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1144 (D. Minn. 2015).
40. See generally Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371–72 (1997) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
41. See Expert Report and Recommendations at 52, Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F.
Supp. 3d 1139, No. 0:11-cv-03659-DWF-JJK (D. Minn. 2015), ECF No. 658, http://
stmedia.startribune.com/documents/Expert+panel+report+on+sex+offender
+program.pdf.
42. See id.; Don Betzold, Commentary, What the Minnesota Sex Offender Program
Was Meant to Be, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis) (June 30, 2015), http://
www.startribune.com/what-the-minnesota-sex-offender-program-was-meant-to-be
/311061851 (“The sex offender treatment program is like a prison—only worse,
because there’s no ‘out’ date.”).
43. JANUS, supra note 1, at 2–3.
44. E.g., Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1143–44.
45. E.g., id. at 1169.
46. E.g., id. at 1173.
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Minnesota created a preventative detention system to address
47
future risk of danger. Civil commitment seeks to prevent future
48
harm to society—because it is forward looking.
Civil commitment systems detain (and aim to rehabilitate)
49
individuals for the benefit of keeping society safe. Therefore, the
conditions of that individual’s detention should not be punitive,
but instead should be rehabilitative as the individual moves along a
continuum of treatment with the ultimate goal of safe release back
50
to the community. This is where many civil commitment systems
51
fail. They fail in one respect because they do not actually provide
meaningful treatment for individuals (including regular reviews of
52
risk assessment). They fail in a greater respect because the actual
experience of the individuals housed in these programs is in many
cases worse than prison—it looks and feelswithin the scope of
53
their daily liveslike punishment.
From the onset, civil commitment systems have been
54
entangled with the criminal justice system. They provide a way to
keep dangerous people incapacitated beyond their prison term.
Currently, the dangerous individual is not punished but is instead
housed (suffering an intrusion on his or her liberty) for the
55
ultimate benefit of society. Many feel safer knowing people who
have committed sexually violent crimes will not simply be released
from prison—but instead will be housed somewhere far away from
the mainstream. Using civil commitment schemes as a pretext for
punishment degrades the integrity and morality of our criminal
47. E.g., id.
48. E.g., id. at 1143–44; see also Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness:
Cloaking Preventative Justice as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1446 (2001)
(“Detention for longer than the deserved term of imprisonment is justified as
preventing predicted future crimes. Such detention not only punishes an offense
for which the detainee has not yet been convicted, but also punishes an offense
that he has not yet committed. But the ability to punish the uncommitted crime,
and thereby prevent it, is the genius of the current system’s cloaking of preventive
detention as criminal justice.”).
49. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372 (1997) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
50. See generally Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1167–68.
51. Id. at 1174.
52. See infra Section II.C.3.
53. See infra notes 267–68.
54. Robinson, supra note 48, at 1454 (discussing the relationship between
prevention in civil commitment and criminal justice).
55. Id. at 1446.
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justice system. This unconstitutional use also violates the
individual rights of the people it is designed to help, further
degrading our sense of rehabilitative justice.
2.

Social Considerations

Society’s collective interests in social policy directly influence
the legislature and criminal justice system to act in accordance with
57
its wishes. The obvious societal interest at stake in the release of
58
sex offenders from prison is the safety of the public. All sex
offenders are deemed the “‘worst of the worst’violent predators
59
too dangerous for public release.” The image that comes to mind
when thinking of a sex offender is naturally the “worst of the worst”
within the population of all sex offendersthe most frightening
60
image conceivable. Because of this, the public deeply fears sex
61
offenders will reoffend because of their violent pasts.
It is extremely difficult to predict the rate of recidivism in sex
62
offenders. The rate of recidivism varies between states as well as
63
the length of time between follow-ups. What studies do show,
though, is that sex offender treatment results in a reduction in the

56. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371–73 (1997) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
57. See generally, e.g., Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d, 1139, 1174 (D. Minn.
2015); Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 25, 72.
58. E.g., NANCY A. JOHNSTON, MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., TREATMENT
OVERVIEW: MINNESOTA SEX OFFENDER PROGRAM 1 (2015), http://
www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/groups/agencywide/documents/pub/dhs16_167937
.pdf; see Betzold, supra note 42.
59. Chris Serres, Minnesota Sex Offenders: Are They Really the ‘Worst of the Worst’?,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis) (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.startribune.com/minnesota
-sex-offenders-are-they-really-the-worst-of-the-worst/233945281; see also Betzold,
supra note 42.
60. Serres, supra note 59.
61. E.g., JANUS, supra note 1, at 2; MSOP FAQs, supra note 5 (click on “How
does the program help clients transition to the community?”) (“Public safety is the
department’s top priority.”).
62. E.g., Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science:
Future Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 697, 712
(2011).
63. See, e.g., Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 39;
Hamilton, supra note 62, at 708; No Easy Answers: Sex Offender Laws in the US, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Sept. 11, 2007), https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/09/11/no-easy
-answers/sex-offender-laws-us.

11. Woolman_FF4 (1363-1433) (Do Not Delete)

2016]

GOING AGAINST THE GRAIN

6/24/2016 11:29 AM

1373

64

rate of sexual recidivism. One study found that the rate of sexual
recidivism in sex offenders who receive treatment is 12.3%, while
65
those who do not receive treatment reoffend at a rate of 16.8%.
B.

Rise in Sex Offender Civil Commitment Popularity

The origins and rise of SOCC are fairly uniform between
Minnesota and other jurisdictions around the nation. Both
experienced a first and second wave of SOCC laws, which were
heavily influenced by a heightened concern about sexual offenses,
heavy media attention, and ultimately, legislative action. The
differentiating factor between the two is the case-specific instances
in Minnesota and other states alike.
1.

Increase in Popularity Nationwide

The mid-1930s bore a first wave of hysteria surrounding sex
66
crimes. Sexuality became a respected study and “the influence of
psychoanalytic theories on American psychiatry during the 1930s
67
provided an intellectual base for a sexual theory of crime.” The
increased relationship between the criminal justice system and
psychiatry led to the use of a new term, the sexual psychopath, to
explain the patterns of wearisome prisoners, ultimately leading to
68
the creation of a new deviant population. As the study of sexual
psychopaths expanded into the late 1930s, writers linked sexual
deviances such as “exhibitionists, sadists, masochists, and voyeurs”
69
to the commission of sexual crimes. The chief psychotherapist at a
hospital in Washington D.C., Benjamin Karpman, identified sexual
psychopaths by their inability to control their sexual impulses

64. E.g., Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 32, 38;
REAGAN DALY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, TREATMENT AND REENTRY PRACTICES FOR SEX
OFFENDERS: AN OVERVIEW OF STATES 3–4 (2008), http://www.csom.org
/pubs/Treatment%20and%20Reentry%20for%20SO%20an%20overview%20of
%20states.pdf.
65. Id.
66. Estelle B. Freedman, “Uncontrolled Desires”: The Response to the Sexual
Psychopath, 1920–1960, 74 J. AM. HIST. 83, 84 (1987); Bela August Walker, Essay:
Deciphering Risk: Sex Offender Statutes and Moral Panic in a Risk Society, 40 U. BALT. L.
REV. 183, 188 (2010).
67. Freedman, supra note 66, at 88.
68. See id. at 88–89.
69. Id. at 91 (internal citation omitted).
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because these people were “all instinct and impulse.” His vision
caught fire because of its connection to the theory of the born
criminal and eventuated in intense media attention, and,
ultimately, the first wave of sex offender laws—the sexual
71
psychopathic personality statutes.
a.

The First Wave of Sex Offender Civil Commitment Laws

Michigan passed the first sexual psychopathic personality
72
statute in 1937. The incident that ultimately led to Michigan’s law
was the murder and mutilation of a young girl, whose body was
found in an apartment by a man who had been committed to a
73
mental institution for sex crimes. The statute was subsequently
found unconstitutional, but by 1939, three additional states had
passed sexual psychopathic personality statutes—Illinois in 1938,
74
and California and Minnesota in 1939. Eventually, more than half
of the states enacted sexual psychopathic personality statutes, which
75
afforded sex offenders special medical and legal treatment.
Committees were civilly committed as an alternative to prison
76
sentences. The laws were “touted as a scientific, enlightened
response to dangerous sex offenders that would achieve two goals:
remove the sex offender from the community, and treat the
77
underlying mental condition.” This trend continued into the
1960s and subsequently went widely unused until the second wave
78
of sex offender civil commitment laws.
b.

The Second Wave of Sex Offender Civil Commitment Laws

Washington was the first state to reinvigorate sex offender civil
79
commitment laws in 1990. Its new statute was passed as a response
to the intense public outcry after recidivist sex offenders committed
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST. 43,
55 (1998).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 55–56.
77. Id. at 55 (internal citation omitted).
78. See id.
79. See WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, A SUMMARY OF RECENT FINDINGS
FROM THE COMMUNITY PROTECTION RESEARCH PROJECT 1 (1994).
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a series of sex crimes against women and children. Many states
followed shortly thereafter and modeled their statutes after
81
Washington. Today, twenty states and the federal government
82
have SOCC statutes.
The general outline of most statutes for SOCC is that the
person has a history of sexual offenses, a mental abnormality or
personality disorder, and because of the combination of the two, is
83
deemed likely to sexually reoffend. Unlike the first wave of SOCC
laws, sex offenders are now committed near the end of their prison
84
sentence.
Constitutional challenges were brought under the second wave
of SOCC laws. The first time the U.S. Supreme Court heard a case
that challenged the new wave of SOCC statutes was in Kansas v.
85
Hendricks. Leroy Hendricks was civilly committed under Kansas’
Sexually Violent Predator Act, which permits commitment of sex
offenders who, because of a mental abnormality or personality
86
disorder, are likely to engage in future sex offenses. On appeal,
the Kansas Supreme Court ruled the statute unconstitutional
because the statutory definition of “mental abnormality” did not
87
satisfy substantive due process. Instead, it overruled Kansas’
statute, stating that SOCC must be initiated because of a “mental
88
illness.” On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in the converse:
The Act’s definition of “mental abnormality” satisfies
“substantive” due process requirements . . . . The Act
unambiguously requires a precommitment finding of
dangerousness either to one’s self or to others, and links
80. E.g., Marie A. Bochnewich, Prediction of Dangerousness and Washington’s
Sexually Violent Predator Statute, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 277, 277 (1992) (citing WASH.
REV. CODE. ANN. § 71.09.010–.902 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991)); see, e.g., Lieb et al.,
supra note 72, at 66.
81. Id. at 67.
82. Monica Davey, A New Look at Sex Offenders and Lockups, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
30, 2015, at A1.
83. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02, subdiv. (a) (West, Westlaw through
2015 Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. § 253D.02, subdiv. 16 (2014 & Supp. 2015); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 980.01, subdiv. 7 (West, Westlaw through 2015); Bochnewich, supra
note 80, at 277.
84. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03, subdiv. (a)(1) (Westlaw); MINN.
STAT. § 253D.07, subdiv. 1; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.015, subdiv. (2)(a) (Westlaw).
85. 521 U.S. 346, 346 (1997).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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that finding to a determination that the person suffers
from a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder.”
Generally, this Court has sustained a commitment statute
if it couples proof of dangerousness with proof of some
additional factor, such as a “mental illness” or “mental
abnormality,” . . . for these additional requirements serve
to limit confinement to those who suffer from a volitional
impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their
control. The Act sets forth comparable criteria with its
precommitment requirement of “mental abnormality” or
89
“personality disorder.”
The second challenge to the constitutionality during a second
wave of SOCC statutes was only a few years later in Kansas v. Crane,
which challenged the other the lack of control over sexual
90
behavior. The Kansas Supreme Court had ruled that Kansas’
SOCC statute was unconstitutional because it required a showing of
the inability to control sexual actions as a prerequisite for civil
91
commitment. Although not formally codified in Kansas’ SOCC
statute, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the statute contained
an implied requirement of the inability to control one’s sexual
92
behavior. Because Crane had some control over his actions, the
state supreme court ruled that Crane’s civil commitment was
93
unconstitutional. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled
94
the state supreme court’s decision. Instead, the Court relied on
Hendricks and ruled that there was “no requirement of total or
complete lack of control, but the Constitution does not permit
commitment of the type of dangerous sexual offender considered
95
in Hendricks without any lack-of-control determination.”
The civil commitment of sex offenders was revitalized in the
1990s due to select heinous sex crimes against women and
children, which were subsequently given immense media attention,
increased political pressure, and ultimately led to the resurfacing of

89. Id. at 346–47.
90. 534 U.S. 407, 407 (2002).
91. Id.
92. Id.; John M. Fabian, Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond: “Mental
Abnormality” and “Sexual Dangerousness”: Volitional vs. Emotional Abnormality and the
Debate Between Community Safety and Civil Liberties, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1367,
1399 (2003).
93. Crane, 534 U.S. at 407; Fabian, supra note 92, at 1400.
94. Crane, 534 U.S. at 407.
95. Id.
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SOCC statutes nationwide. As discussed below, Minnesota follows
this pattern of change and implementation.
2.

Increase in Popularity in Minnesota

In order to understand the current design and programming
of the MSOP, the historical origins of the civil commitment of sex
offenders in Minnesota must be explored. In the 1990s, there was a
considerable increase in SOCC followed abruptly by another
substantial increase in commitment in the early 2000s. Both
increases were due in large part to societal and media influence,
which gave rise to what the MSOP is today.
Civil commitment for sex offenders existed in Minnesota long
96
before the MSOP. Unlike the MSOP, civil commitment for sex
offenders in Minnesota was historically rooted as an alternative to a
97
criminal charge and conviction. From 1939 to the 1980s, those
deemed to have a “psychopathic personality” under Minnesota’s
Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute were civilly committed to
98
the Minnesota State Security Hospital in St. Peter for an indefinite
99
period of time.
Within its first year of enactment, Minnesota’s Sexual
Psychopathic
Personality
Statute’s
constitutionality
was
100
challenged. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the law and
the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the “sexual
psychopathic personality” law was not unconstitutionally uncertain
101
or vague. To satisfy the “psychopathic personality” requirement,
sex offenders had to display:
conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of
behavior, or lack of customary standards of good
judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of
personal acts, or a combination of any such conditions,
. . . render such person irresponsible for personal conduct

96. JANUS, supra note 1, at 22; see MINN. STAT. § 253D.02, subdiv. 15 (2014),
declared unconstitutional by Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1147 (D. Minn.
2015).
97. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1146; JANUS, supra note 1, at 22.
98. See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1146; JANUS, supra note 1, at 29.
99. OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY
COMMITMENT LAW 9 (1994) [hereinafter PSYCHOPATHIC COMMITMENT LAW].
100. State ex rel. Pearson v. Prob. Court, 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939),
aff’d, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
101. Id.
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with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to
102
other persons.
In 1989, the Minnesota Legislature broadened the use of
103
SOCC. During sentencing, judges were required to decide if civil
commitment was appropriate for sexual offenders, as opposed to
104
the ad hoc commitment system previously utilized. If appropriate,
the judge recommended the sex offender to the county attorney,
105
who initiated proceedings for civil commitment.
106
SOCC fell into disuse in the 1970s and 1980s. However, in
1992 the Minnesota Legislature enacted a statute to modify the
procedural screening process of those imprisoned for sexual
107
offenses. The new statute called for the evaluation of high-risk
offenders by the Department of Corrections near the end of their
108
sentence prior to their release from prison. In conjunction with
its previous use, sex offenders were civilly committed rather than
109
serving prison sentences. Many states followed suit. The second
generation of SOCC statutes across the United States varied, but
had central characteristics in common: their specific purpose is to
confine and treat offenders determined to have a mental
110
abnormality and are likely or highly likely to reoffend.
In the 1990s, screening was reserved for “repeat sex offenders
who either had failed or refused to participate in sex offender
111
treatment while in prison.”
Today, the Department of
Corrections recommends prisoners to the county attorney in the
county of the offense underlying their imprisonment and the
112
county attorney initiates civil commitment proceedings.

102. JANUS, supra note 1, at 29 (quoting Pearson, 205 Minn. at 555, 287 N.W. at
302).
103. See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1146.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. JANUS, supra note 1, at 29; PSYCHOPATHIC COMMITMENT LAW, supra note
99.
107. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1146.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Eric S. Janus & Jon Brandt, Karsjens v. Jesson: Challenging the Un-Civil
Commitment of Civil Rights, ACCESS TO JUST., July 2, 2015, at 4, http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/litigation_committees
/access/summer2015.authcheckdam.pdf.
111. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1146 (D. Minn. 2015).
112. Id. at 1146–47.
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The evaluation of sex offenders near the end of their prison
113
sentence marked a drastic change in the character of SOCC.
Previously, sex offenders were civilly committed as an alternative to
serving prison sentences, seeking to care for “those too sick to
114
deserve punishment.”
Although “[i]t is fundamental to our
notions of a free society that we do not imprison citizens because
115
we fear that they might commit a crime in the future[,]” sex
offenders today are civilly committed for an indeterminate period
116
of time, in addition to completing prison sentences in order to
117
ensure public safety.
In 1994, the Minnesota Legislature further broadened SOCC
to include individuals found to be a “sexually dangerous person” in
118
addition to the previous Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute.
Today, sex offenders are civilly committed if they possess a “sexual
psychopathic personality” and/or are a “sexually dangerous
119
person.”
Civil commitment in Minnesota rose in frequency after the
120
passage of the new screening process in 1992. Civil commitment
went from being a prison alternative to a virtual extension of the
121
sex offender’s prison sentence. In 1990, the total population of
122
civilly committed sex offenders was only two people and in 1992,
123
the population was twenty-two. The MSOP was created in 1994 to

113.
114.
115.
116.

JANUS, supra note 1, at 22.
Id. (citation omitted).
Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1143.
MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., MINNESOTA SEX OFFENDER PROGRAM
PERFORMANCE REPORT 23 (2012) [hereinafter ANNUAL PERFORMANCE

ANNUAL
REPORT].
117. Id.; JANUS, supra note 1, at 22.
118. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1146.
119. MINN. STAT. § 253D.02, subdiv. 4 (2014 & Supp. 2015). Sex offenders may
be civilly committed under Minnesota Statutes section 235D.02, subdivisions 15
and 16 or a previous version of such, including section 526.10. MINN. STAT.
§ 253D.02, subdivs. 15–16; MINN. STAT. § 526.10 (1994).
120. See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1146; PSYCHOPATHIC COMMITMENT LAW,
supra note 99, at xi (“[T]he number of psychopathic personality commitments has
increased sharply, largely because the Department of Corrections now routinely
screens soon-to-be-released sex offenders and notifies county attorneys if the
department thinks [Psychopathic Personality] commitment may be appropriate.”).
121. See JANUS, supra note 1, at 22.
122. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1146.
123. Id.
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deal with the increase in civilly committed sex offenders. By
December 2012, the total population of the MSOP was 678
125
individuals and as of December 31, 2015, 726 sex offenders are
126
confined to the MSOP. To account for the drastic increase in the
population of the MSOP, one must explore how changes in public
policy are the direct result of voluminous media coverage and
intense public outcry.
III. THE MSOP
In recent years, the MSOP has grown substantially in its
number of patients, likely due to two specific cases—Dennis
Linehan and Alfonso Rodriguez, Jr.—who had a history of
committing sex offenses. Both significantly influenced the civil
commitment of sex offenders in Minnesota because of the public
outcry associated with their cases and actions. Because of this,
current MSOP programming and statistics show that the changes to
the system and the statute under which sex offenders are civilly
committed was a knee-jerk reaction to a select few heinous cases. As
a result, the MSOP is different than other SOCC programs in the
nation and greatly lags behind in its effectiveness. This forces us to
ask: What has the MSOP become?
A.

Growth of the MSOP in Minnesota

Two very public cases changed the civil commitment of sex
offenders in Minnesota. The case of Dennis Linehan directly
changed the statute under which sex offenders are civilly
127
committed in Minnesota. The case of Alfonso Rodriguez, Jr., who
reoffended when he killed Dru Sjodin after his release from prison
128
for a sex crime, changed the way in which the new statute was
implemented.
Dennis Linehan’s case is one of swift legislative reform.
Linehan had a long history of sexual offenses prior to his release
124. See id. at 1146–47.
125. ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 116, at 22.
126. MSOP FAQs, supra note 5 (click on “How many people are in the
Minnesota Sex Offender Program?”).
127. See, e.g., JANUS, supra note 1, at 27.
128. See, e.g., Caroline Palmer & Bradley Prowant, Re-Thinking Minnesota’s
Criminal Justice Response to Sexual Violence Using a Prevention Lens, 39 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1584, 1596 (2013).
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129

on parole in 1992. In 1965, at the age of twenty-four, he killed a
130
fourteen-year-old girl while sexually assaulting her. Prior to the
sexual assault and murder of his 1965 victim, Linehan had sexually
131
assault or attempted to sexually assault seven known victims. After
a ten-year prison sentence, Linehan escaped from a minimumsecurity prison and was arrested a few days later and two states away
from Minnesota for trying to sexually assault a twelve-year-old
132
girl.
In 1992, Linehan was paroled for good behavior after a ten133
year prison term. He had served a total of twenty-seven years in
134
prison for multiple sex crimes. Although he had completed
135
chemical dependency and sex offender treatment in prison, he
became one of the first candidates for sexual predator commitment
136
in Minnesota.
Linehan’s civil commitment proceedings were brought under
the Pearson test, which allowed civil commitment of people who:
by a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, have
evidenced an utter lack of power to control their sexual
impulses and who, as a result, are likely to attack or
otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the
137
objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire.
Because civil commitment went widely unused until the early
138
139
1990s, the Pearson test was forgotten as well. After years of
litigation and appeals, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that
the State did not meet its burden of showing Linehan had an “utter

129. JANUS, supra note 1, at 27.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 243.166, subdiv. 5a (2014 & Supp. 2015).
134. JANUS, supra note 1, at 27.
135. Id. at 28.
136. Id. at 27.
137. Id. at 29 (quoting State ex rel. Pearson v. Prob. Court, 205 Minn. 545, 555,
287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939)) (emphasis added). Interestingly enough, the Pearson
test required a lack of power to control, while criminal sex crimes require a form
of intent or control. See Larry Oakes, The New Life Sentence: A Long-Standing, Thorny
Issue for Minnesota and the Courts, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 8, 2008, at 14A,
LEXIS.
138. See supra note 112.
139. JANUS, supra note 1, at 29.
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lack of power to control” himself in sexual matters under the
140
Pearson test.
Public outcry after the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision
was instantaneous. Newspapers headlined the court’s decision in
anger and political officials and candidates publicly spoke out
141
against the decision. Mike Hatch, then campaigning for state
attorney general, urged “the governor to call a special session of
the legislature to ‘tighten’ (more accurately, ‘loosen’) the civil
142
commitment law.” Hatch was critical of the Pearson test. Instead,
he advocated that the legislature look closer at sex offender
recidivism and the risk to public safety involved in releasing sex
143
offenders into the community.
In response to public outcry, Governor Arne Carlson called
144
the legislature into special session.
Just eight days before statewide primary elections, the
governor officially called for a one-day, one-bill special

140. In re Linehan (Linehan I), 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1994) (stating the
Ramsey County District Court had failed to provide clear and convincing evidence
that Linehan was utterly unable to control his sexual impulses); In re Linehan, 503
N.W.2d 142, 148 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that (1) Linehan was a person
who met the standards for commitment as a psychopathic personality and, (2) the
psychopathic personality statute was constitutional).
141. “After this court denied the state’s petition for rehearing in Linehan I, the
governor announced that the state would move Linehan to an old staff residence
just outside the prison and keep him under constant surveillance.” In re Linehan
(Linehan II), 557 N.W.2d 171, 198 (Minn. 1996) (Tomjanovich, J., dissenting)
(citing Paul Gustafson & Robert Whereatt, Rapist/Murderer Wins Release—and Tight
Surveillance, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 16, 1994, at 1A). After, Linehan’s
attorney stated his treatment was appalling and the governor responded by saying,
“I’d much rather make a mistake on the side of public safety than be
overwhelmingly concerned with some attorney’s perception of the civil rights of
Mr. Linehan.” Id. Meanwhile, the Ramsey County prosecutor stated, “These are
dangerous people and we’ve got to protect the women and children in our
communities.” Linehan II, 557 N.W.2d at 198 (Tomjanovich, J., Dissenting)
(quoting Mimi Hall, A Furor Brews over Release of Sex Offenders, USA TODAY, Aug. 17,
1994, at 3A). “[An] article quoted State Representative David Bishop, who called
Chief Justice A. M. Keith ‘the chief zookeeper of the zoo. . . . Now he’s proposing
to let the tigers out one by one to see if they’re dangerous.’” JANUS, supra note 1, at
31–32.
142. JANUS, supra note 1, at 31.
143. See id.
144. E.g., Betzold, supra note 42; Jason Hoppin, Are Sex Offenders Patients or
Prisoners?, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, (Feb. 21, 2010), http://www.twincities.com
/ci_14438035.
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legislative session. The legislature convened one week
later and in just 1 hour, 37 minutes passed the SDP Act by
a 65–0 margin in the senate and a 133–0 margin in the
house. Immediately prior to the session, the bill’s drafters
had told their colleagues to avoid speaking about Linehan
specifically because, “Whatever we say on the floor will be
used against us . . . . It’s going to be used to challenge the
145
bill.”
The legislature unanimously passed the new laws, which
included the former “psychopathic personality” act (renamed the
Sexual Psychopathic Personality Act (SPP Act)), and adding those
who are “sexually dangerous person[s]” as defined in the SDP Act
146
to the restructured laws, collectively called MCTA. As a clear
response to Linehan’s case, the legislature wrote, “[I]t is not
necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the
147
person’s sexual impulses” in the reformed SOCC laws.
A few days later, the state filed a petition to civilly commit
148
Under the new
Linehan under the restructured legislation.
149
standard, the state sought to commit Linehan under the SDP Act
150
and its new requirements.
During the Linehan II proceedings, a psychiatric expert
testified that Linehan had antisocial personality disorder and the
151
district court found it highly likely that Linehan would reoffend.
The court of appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed

145. Linehan II, 557 N.W.2d at 198 (Tomjanovich, J., Dissenting) (citing
Donna Halvorsen & Robert Whereatt, Sexual Predator Bill OK’d, Signed, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Sept. 1, 1994, at 1A; Robert Whereatt, Legislators, Carlson Agree to
Session; Ground Rules Set with Goal of Avoiding Partisanship, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Aug. 24, 1994, at 1B).
146. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1147 (D. Minn. 2015).
147. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 18c(b) (1998); see JANUS, supra note 1, at
32.
148. In re Linehan (Linehan III), 594 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Minn. 1999); JANUS,
supra note 1, at 32.
149. Linehan III, 594 N.W.2d at 870.
150. The new laws required the person to have “engaged in a course of
harmful sexual conduct[,] . . . manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental
disorder or dysfunction[,] and as a result, [be] likely to engage in acts of harmful
sexual conduct.” MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 18(a)(1)–(3) (1998).
151. In re Linehan, No. P8-94-0382, at *9–13, 23–24, 26 (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct.,
July 27, 1995).
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152

the district court’s ruling.
To this day, Linehan is civilly
153
committed to the MSOP.
Dennis Linehan’s story is one of heinous sex crimes and quick
legislative action resulting from immense outcry from the media,
the public, and individual legislators in response to his failed civil
commitment under the “psychopathic personality” act after
Linehan I. Arguably, the media and individual legislators, in
conjunction, is the most effective vehicle for notions of social
change today. Conversely, legislators and the media are the most
effective conduits for influencing societal mindsets regarding a
particular social issue. A combination of both forms of influence
feeding off one another creates the perfect recipe for change. In
the case of Dennis Linehan, the combination of the three quickly
changed the way sex offenders are civilly committed in Minnesota.
Sex offenders are now civilly committed under a broadened set
of laws implemented directly in response to Linehan’s case. Today,
Linehan’s story remains in the memories of many Minnesotans
because of its impact on Minnesota law and its surrounding
controversy. In recent months since the Karsjens decision, the
154
media is quick to retell the tale of Dennis Linehan, whose case
155
changed the fate of civilly committed sex offenders in Minnesota.
Instead of the outcry that followed Linehan I, the media is now
more likely to question the Minnesota Legislature’s hasty revision
156
of sex offender commitment law.
Individual legislators have
157
followed suit.
After twenty-five years and a ruling of the

152. Linehan III, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999); In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
153. JANUS, supra note 1, at 28.
154. See, e.g., John Croman, Judge Rules Minnesota Sex Offender Program
Unconstitutional, KARE 11, Aug. 10, 2015, http://www.kare11.com/story/news
/local/2015/06/17/judge-rules-minnesota-sex-offender-program-unconstitutional
/28863371/; Pat Kessler, Reality Check: Minnesota’s Sex Offender Treatment Program,
CBS MINN., June 18, 2015, http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/06/18/reality
-check-minnesotas-sex-offender-treatment-program; Editorial, Searching for Answers
on Sex Offenders: Can Indefinite Confinement Be the Right Choice for All?, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), June 15, 2008, at 4OP.
155. Compare MINN. STAT. § 253D.02, subdivs. 15–16 (2014 & Supp. 2015), with
MINN. STAT. § 526.10 (1994).
156. Compare Linehan III, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999), and In re Linehan,
544 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), with JANUS, supra note 1, at 27.
157. See, e.g., Kathy Sheran, MSOP: A Minnesota State Senator’s Perspective, 41
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 689, 690 (2015).
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unconstitutionality of the MSOP, the media, legislators, and the
public are finally asking themselves: Did we get it wrong?
Alfonso Rodriguez, Jr.’s case is one of swift change in the
implementation of the MSOP. Rodriguez was released from prison
in May 2003 after serving a twenty-three-year sentence as a level
158
three repeat sex offender. Reaffirming the public’s fears, he
reoffended.
Dru Sjodin was a college student that Rodriguez abducted
from a shopping center in Grand Forks, North Dakota on
159
November 22, 2003. Her body was later found in Minnesota in
160
April of 2004 after the snow melted. She had been raped,
161
tortured, and murdered.
Ten days after Sjodin’s abduction, Rodriguez was arrested and
162
charged with her kidnapping. His charges were later amended to
include willfully transporting Sjodin in interstate commerce and
163
murder. Rodriguez’s case was tried in federal court where he was
164
165
sentenced to death. He is currently on death row.
166
Rodriguez’s case garnered significant national attention. He
has never been an inmate at the MSOP, but this did not stop his
158. Sex offender levels are determined by the Minnesota Department of
Corrections’ policies, which use risk assessments to assign individual offenders a
numerical risk value based on the individual’s risk of reoffending. Level I
offenders have a predicted probability of sexual recidivism of 3.49% or lower,
Level II offenders have a predicted probability of sexual recidivism between 3.50%
and 9.99%, and Level III offenders have a predicted probability of sexual
recidivism at or above 10%. MINN. DEP’T CORR., POLICY 205.220, PREDATORY
OFFENDER: REGISTRATION, COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION, VICTIM NOTIFICATION, LEVEL 3
WEBSITE, AND RISK LEVEL REASSESSMENT REQUEST (2013), http://www.doc.state.mn
.us/DocPolicy2/html/DPW_Display_TOC.asp?Opt=205.220.htm; JANUS, supra note
1, at 1.
159. JANUS, supra note 1, at 1.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lee, 10 Years Later, Dru Sjodin’s Kidnapping, Murder
Changed Law and Society, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, (Nov. 21, 2013), http://
www.twincities.com/localnews/ci_24575871/10-years-later-dru-sjodins-kidnapping
-murder-changed.
162. Id.
163. United States v. Rodriguez, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1335 (D.N.D. 2005),
aff’d on other grounds, 581 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2009).
164. Dan Gunderson, Judge Sentences Alfonso Rodriguez Jr. to Death, MINN. PUB.
RADIO NEWS, Feb. 8, 2007, http://www.mprnews.org/story/2007/02/08
/rodriguezsentence.
165. Id.
166. See id.
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case from forever changing both the way Minnesotans view the
MSOP and the way in which the Department of Corrections
implements the referral of inmates to the program. The public was
outraged that “officials decided not to take the . . . step of seeking
[Rodriguez’s] civil commitment to a secure treatment facility as a
167
‘sexually dangerous person.’” Countless Minnesota and North
Dakota residents searched for Ms. Sjodin when she was abducted—
the public had an emotional stake in her case and did not feel she
168
received justice.
As a result of Sjodin’s murder, Congress passed the Adam
169
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, which President George
170
W. Bush signed into law on July 27, 2006. A provision of the Act
includes the creation of the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender
171
Public Website (Sjodin Act). The website provides nationwide sex
offender data which allows concerned residents to search for sex
172
offenders in their area. The Sjodin Act is an example of public
173
backlash on sex offender policy on a national level.
On the local level, the Minnesota Department of Corrections
drastically increased the number of inmate referrals to the MSOP
174
175
in response to public outcry after Sjodin’s death. Between 1991
167. JANUS, supra note 1, at 1.
168. See, e.g., Missing N.D. Student Dru Sjodin Found, FOX NEWS (Apr. 18, 2004),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2004/04/18/missing-nd-student-dru-sjodin-found
.html.
169. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–91 (2006)).
170. The Dru Sjodin Story, NAT’L SEX OFFENDER PUB. WEBSITE, https://
www.nsopw.gov/en/Home/DruSjodin (last visited May 19, 2016).
171. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act § 120, 120 Stat. at 597
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16920 (2006)); see The Dru Sjodin Story, supra note 170.
172. About NSOPW, NAT’L SEX OFFENDER PUB. WEBSITE, https://www.nsopw.gov
/en/Home/About (last visited May 19, 2016).
173. Another example of public backlash on national sex offender policy is
Washington State’s enactment of Megan’s Law, which was passed in memory of
Megan Kanka, who was raped and murdered by a released sex offender who lived
across the street from her. Lucy Berliner, Sex Offenders: Policy and Practice, 92 NW.
U. L. REV. 1203, 1217 (1998) (citing William Glaberson, At Center of “Megan’s Law”
Case, A Man the System Couldn’t Reach, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1996, at C10). Congress
later added Washington’s version of Megan’s Law to the Jacob Wetterling Act in
1996. Id. Megan’s Law is now in effect in all fifty states. Id.
174. “‘How do you not contemplate the ongoing detention of these offenders,
or at least severe restrictions on their activities?’ [North Dakota Lieutenant
Governor Drew Wrigley] said. ‘Are we to do nothing but react to the next victim?
The public is fed up.’” Chuck Haga, Ten Years After Dru Sjodin’s Abduction, “She
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and 2003, prior to Sjodin’s murder, the Minnesota Department of
Corrections referred about twenty-six offenders per year to county
176
attorneys. In December of 2003 alone, one month after Sjodin’s
abduction, the Department of Corrections referred 236 inmates to
177
the MSOP. As of 2011, the number of individuals referred to the
MSOP each year since Sjodin’s death was six times the total
178
number of people referred to the MSOP between 1991 and 2003.
“A large increase has followed the substantial increase in DOC
179
referrals since December 2003.” The increase in referrals to the
180
MSOP is a direct result of Sjodin’s death :
Attorney Thomas Heffelfinger, who worked . . . on
[Rodriguez’s] case as U.S. attorney for Minnesota, said he
saw a rapid shift after Sjodin’s murder in public and
official sentiment over how to deal with high-risk
offenders. “The focus was on getting knowledge and
information out to people and keeping sex offenders
locked up through civil commitment,” he said. “Over here
in Minnesota, more pressure was put on county attorneys
to review these cases for civil commitment a lot more
181
quickly and more aggressively.”

Reminds Us Every Day How Precious Life Is”, MINNPOST (Nov. 22, 2013), https://
www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2013/11/ten-years-after-dru-sjodins-abduction
-she-reminds-us-every-day-how-precious-.
175. Palmer & Prowant, supra note 128, at 1595–96.
176. SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT ADVISORY TASK FORCE, SELECTED
MATERIALS REGARDING THE SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT ADVISORY TASK FORCE
39 (2013), http://www.senate.mn/committees/2013-2014/1016_Committee_on
_Judiciary/SelectedMaterials%20Regarding%20the%20Sex%20Offend_3.pdf
(citing OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, EVALUATION REPORT: CIVIL
COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS 1 (2011)).
177. Mark A. Ostrem, MSOP: A County Attorney’s Perspective, 41 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 698, 699 (2015).
178. OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, EVALUATION REPORT: CIVIL
COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS 28 (2011) [hereinafter OLA EVALUATION REPORT],
http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/ccso.pdf. See generally Lucy
Massopust & Raina Borrelli, “A Perfect Storm”: Minnesota’s Sex Offender Program—
More Than Twenty Years Without Successful Reintegration, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
706 (2015).
179. OLA EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 178, at 29.
180. Ostrem, supra note 177, at 699; see, e.g., GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON SEX
OFFENDER POLICY, FINAL REPORT 7 (2005), http://archive.leg.state.mn.us/docs
/2005/other/050099.pdf.
181. Lee, supra note 161.
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Since Sjodin’s murder, SOCC has increased sharply largely
182
because of her murder. The current population of the MSOP is
183
“[d]ue in no small part to the Sjodin case.” Today, Minnesota has
the highest number of civilly committed sex offenders per capita of
184
any state in the United States and boasts the lowest percentage of
185
release of any other state.
The case of Alfonso Rodriguez, Jr.’s release and subsequent reoffense affirmed the public’s fear of released sex offenders. After
Rodriguez was released from prison, he kidnapped and murdered
186
Dru Sjodin, an innocent college student. As an obvious result, the
public was outraged that he was not civilly committed as a sex
187
offender. Sjodin’s murder led to many drastic federal policy
188
changes. Society’s outrage after Sjodin’s murder also led to
Minnesota’s drastic changes in the implementation of its SOCC
laws and as a direct result, there has been a substantial increase in
189
the number of civilly committed sex offenders since her death.
B.

Overview of the Current Program

Currently, sex offenders civilly committed in the MSOP
encompass a broad range of individuals, varying in age, mental
capacity, and life experiences. Despite this fact, the MSOP is a
uniform system for all patients. An overview of the current program
is needed to gauge the scope of the deficiencies in Minnesota’s civil
commitment of sex offenders.

182. Id.; see also supra notes 178–79.
183. Haga, supra note 174.
184. E.g., Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1148 (D. Minn.), motion to
certify appeal denied, No. CIV. 11-3659, 2015 WL 4478972 (D. Minn. July 22, 2015);
ERIC J. MAGNUSON & JAMES ROSENBAUM, SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT ADVISORY
TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 1 (2013) [hereinafter TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT],
https://cbsminnesota.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/sotf-report.pdf; Haga, supra
note 174; see also Sex Offender Civil Commitment Advisory Task Force, MINN. DEP’T
HUM. SERVS., http://mn.gov/dhs/general-public/about-dhs/advisory-councils-task
-forces/sex-offender-task-force.jsp (providing resources related to the Task Force
including reports, court orders, meeting minutes, and links to legislation).
185. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1147.
186. See supra notes 162–64.
187. JANUS, supra note 1, at 136–37; Lee, supra note 161.
188. United States v. Rodriguez, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1335 (D.N.D. 2005)
aff’d on other grounds, 581 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2009); Gunderson, supra note 164;
Lee, supra note 161.
189. See supra notes 180–84.
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Statistics

In recent years, the MSOP has become larger than life. There
are currently 726 individuals civilly committed to the MSOP,
190
costing Minnesota taxpayers $83.7 million per year. This means
that each committee costs taxpayers almost $120,000 per year.
Clients in the MSOP are between the ages of twenty-one and
191
ninety-three, with an average age of forty-eight. As of June 2015,
192
sixty-seven juvenile-only offenders were committed to the MSOP.
For too long, too many people have been civilly committed to
the MSOP. To date, five people have been provisionally discharged
193
in the twenty-two year history of the MSOP. In contrast, the same
number of people were civilly committed to the MSOP between
October 26, 2015 and December 31, 2015in just over two
194
months.
2.

Programming

The MSOP consists of three phases, each of indeterminate
195
Although modules or phases are common amongst
length.
196
jurisdictions with SOCC programs, programming at the MSOP
197
has changed many times since its inception in 1994. The MSOP’s
Theory Manual states that the most important factor in sex
198
offender treatment is the client’s willingness to change. Other
important factors include skill acquisition, rehearsal, and

190. MSOP FAQs, supra note 5 (click on “What is the total operating cost of the
sex offender treatment program?”); see Esme Murphy, WCCO Investigates
Minnesota’s Sex Offender Program, CBS MINN. (Apr. 22, 2015), http://
minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/04/22/wcco-investigates-minnesotas-sex-offender
-program (“It’s outrageous. The taxpayers should be screaming to their politicians
about it.”).
191. MSOP FAQs, supra note 5 (click on “How old are the clients?”).
192. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1152 (D. Minn.), motion to certify
appeal denied, No. CIV. 11-3659, 2015 WL 4478972 (D. Minn. July 22, 2015).
193. MSOP FAQs, supra note 5 (click on “Has anyone ever been released from
the program?”).
194. As of October 26, 2015, 722 people were civilly committed to the MSOP.
By December 31, 2015, that number increased to 726. See MSOP FAQs, supra note
5.
195. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1153.
196. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 27.
197. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1153.
198. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 28.
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implementation, which allow clients to make changes and
199
implement new behaviors.
Although the MSOP’s treatment manual permits individuals to
begin treatment in different stages of treatment depending on
their background and previous sex offender treatment, all
200
committed individuals at the MSOP start in Phase I. While client
willingness to change is the most important factor in treatment at
the MSOP, clients are not assessed on their willingness to change
201
when determining phase placement upon intake at the MSOP.
In its current programming, Phase I of the MSOP concentrates
on rule conformity, engagement in treatment, and emotional
202
regulation. It also serves as a basic introduction to treatment
203
concepts.
Clients do not receive any specific sex offender
204
treatment during Phase I.
Civilly committed sex offenders begin actual treatment for
sexual offenses in Phase II, which focuses on “addressing patterns
205
of sexually abusive behavior and cycles.” This concentrates on the
person’s sexual offending history, maladaptive patterns, and the
206
person’s motives and rationale behind their behavior. The goal
of Phase II is the development of coping strategies to avoid
207
recidivism.
Civil committees begin reintegration planning during Phase
208
III. Reintegration planning is available only for individuals in

199. Id.
200. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1154.
201. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 30; see Karsjens,
109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, at 1154 (“There are no reports or assessments conducted at
the time of admission to determine what phase of treatment a committed
individual should be placed in at the MSOP.”).
202. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1153; see Expert Report and
Recommendations, supra note 41, at 30; OLA EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 178,
at 55.
203. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 30; OLA
EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 178, at 55.
204. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1153; OLA EVALUATION REPORT, supra note
178, at 64.
205. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1153; see also OLA EVALUATION REPORT, supra
note 178, at 55 (“In Phase Two, clients are expected to disclose their sexual
offenses and understand their patterns of sexual abuse.”).
206. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1153.
207. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 30.
208. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1153.
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209

Phase III. Here, clients focus on the application of skills they
210
learned during Phase II by utilizing coping mechanisms. This
211
phase is considered the maintenance stage of treatment. During
Phase III, clients continue to “reside in a secure area, but may be
212
allowed supervised access to the community.”
Nearly all
individuals, regardless of phase, wear electronic monitoring ankle
213
bracelets. In addition to wearing electronic monitoring ankle
bracelets, clients in Phase III are monitored by Global Positioning
Satellite because they are given more freedom within the
214
community.
Clients at the MSOP receive the vast majority of their
treatment in a group setting of eight to ten individuals led by co215
216
facilitators. Little individual therapy is offered to MSOP clients.
Although the MCTA requires that civilly committed sex offenders
217
be mentally ill, the MSOP does not have a full-time psychiatrist
218
on staff to serve its population of 726 clients.
C.

Why Minnesota Is Different than the Rest of the Nation

Minnesota’s treatment of civilly committed sex offenders
differs greatly from the national norm. The MSOP fails to
differentiate treatment programming for subgroups of individuals
such as those with severe mental illnesses and those with cognitive
219
It also fails to adequately provide the
capacity limitations.
appropriate number of hours of treatment per week based on
220
national norms and to conduct annual risk assessments. Finally,
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 31.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 27.
216. See id.
217. “Substantive due process requires that civil committees may be confined
only if they are both mentally ill and pose a substantial danger to the public as the
result of that mental illness.” Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. at 1166 (citing Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 (1992) (noting that a “committed acquittee is entitled
to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous”); Call v.
Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995)).
218. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 18.
219. See infra Section II.C.1.
220. See infra Sections II.C.2.–.3.
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the MSOP fails to provide a reduction in custody or discharge for
221
eligible clients.
1.

Failure to Differentiate Treatment Programming

The majority of SOCC programs conduct a formal pretreatment evaluation of each client in order to ascertain treatment
222
goals and targets.
Those SOCC programs have different
treatment tracks for clients based on a number of factors, including
individual intellect, personality, mental health status, and
223
behavioral issues. Essentially, other SOCC programs across the
nation differentiate their treatment of civilly committed sex
224
offenders based on individual needs.
Minnesota does no such thing. Psychological assessments are
conducted sporadically and have little to no effect on identifying an
individualized treatment program based on key factors such as
225
individual intellect. The MSOP is a one-size-fits-all treatment
program for all clients regardless of age, cognitive ability, sex,
226
mental illness, or other physical disabilities.
An example of the MSOP’s failure to differentiate treatment
for subgroups of its clientele is seen in its population of clients with
severe mental illnesses such as schizophrenia, major depression,
schizo-affective disorder, and other conditions that significantly
227
affect the ability of clients to progress in treatment. As previously
stated, the MSOP is inadequate in addressing mental illness in
228
clients.
Other nationwide SOCC programs employ a
comprehensive approach to mental health issues, which includes
229
clinical training, supervision, and psychiatric services. In contrast,
the MSOP narrowly focuses training and treatment upon

221. See infra Section II.C.4.
222. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 26.
223. Id. at 10.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 26.
226. See generally Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1154–56 (D. Minn.
2015). “The confinement of the elderly, individuals with substantive physical or
intellectual disabilities, and juveniles, who might never succeed in the MSOP’s
treatment program or who are otherwise unlikely to reoffend, is of serious
concern for the Court and should be for the parties as well.” Id. at 1175.
227. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 15.
228. Id. at 16.
229. Id. at 16–17.
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problematic sexual behavior, which lends to an environment
wherein mental health disorders are not understood by MSOP
230
Because of this, MSOP clients with significant
clinical staff.
mental illness have severe difficulties in progressing through phases
231
of treatment.
Another example of the MSOP’s failure to differentiate the
treatment program for a subgroup of its population is in its
232
treatment implementation for clients in the Alternative Program.
Clients in this program have “significant barriers to successful
participation in the conventional treatment program, most often
seen in limited intellectual functioning, but also including clients
233
with cognitive limitations, mental illness, and hearing deficits.”
Nationwide best practices include providing specialized tracks for
234
subgroups of clients, such as the special needs population. The
235
MSOP does not differentiate treatment for special needs patients.
The Final Report of the Rule 706 Expert Report and
Recommendations in connection to the Karsjens case found:
Interviews with MSOP treatment and supervisory staff
indicated that the treatment goals and criteria for phase
advancement used for clients in the Alternative Program
are the same as those for anyone else in the MSOP . . . .
[O]ne report stated, “[T]he client does not appear to
understand the treatment, but he tries hard.” In spite of
this acknowledgement, there was no evidence in the
records that staff took steps to modify the program so that
clients with special needs could advance in treatment.
This represents a fundamental failure to adequately
address the treatment responsivity needs of these clients
. . . . Some clients were simply unable to read the Matrix
Factors pocket cards with which they had been provided,
while others could read them but demonstrated a
236
profound lack of understanding of the concepts.
Because of the MSOP’s failure to differentiate treatment
programming, some patients in the Alternative Program may not
230. Id. at 15. Additionally, the MSOP staff perceives symptoms of severe
mental illness as attention seeking behaviors. Id. at 15–16.
231. Id. at 15.
232. See id. at 20.
233. Id.
234. See id. at 34.
235. See id. at 20–21.
236. Id. at 20–21.
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ever be able to complete treatment because of their cognitive
237
capacity limitations.
2.

Failure to Provide the Appropriate Number of Hours of Treatment
Per Week

The MSOP does not provide its patients with enough time in
treatment per week. The national average of the number of hours
238
per week in SOCC programming is sixteen hours. Programming
includes educational, recreational and vocational, community
meetings, individual therapy on a case-by-case basis,
239
psychoeducational modules, and core groups.
The MSOP
reported to the Sex Offender Civil Commitment Programs Network
that its clients spent an average of eight to eleven hours in
240
treatment per week. In reality, clients in the MSOP spend an
241
average of seven-and-a-half hours per week in treatment, which is
on the low end of the number of treatment hours provided to its
242
patients compared to national best practices standards.
3.

Failure to Conduct Valid, Annual Risk Assessments

Minnesota does not conduct annual risk assessments on its
patients to determine if patients meet the statutory requirements
243
for continued treatment. The vast majority of states with SOCC
244
programs require regular risk assessments of their clients. The
MSOP was the only SOCC facility that reported to the Sex Offender
Civil Commitment Programs Network that it conducts risk
237. See Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1157 (D. Minn. 2015).
238. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 26.
239. See id. at 27 (citing SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT PROGRAMS NETWORK,
SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY OF SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT PROGRAMS 28 (2014)
[hereinafter SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY], http://soccpn.org/images/SOCCPN
_Annual_Survey_2014_revised.pdf).
240. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 27.
241. Id. (citing OLA EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 178, at 62–63).
242. OLA EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 178, at 64.
243. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1159 (D. Minn. 2015); Expert
Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 33.
244. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1159; Expert Report and Recommendations,
supra note 41, at 33. “In comparison to most other SOCC programs, in which
periodic reviews of civil commitment status are conducted on a set periodic basis
(e.g., annually), it is unusual and of great concern . . . that assessments of this sort
are only completed at MSOP when a client is actually petitioning for release or
movement to CPS.”). Id.
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assessments only upon petition for a reduction in custody or
245
release. Until very recently, the MSOP has not conducted risk
assessments on individuals until they petition for a reduction in
246
custody. As of June 2015, the only risk assessment the MSOP has
ever conducted outside of the petitioning process was for a class
247
member involved in the Karsjens litigation.
The MSOP does not have a manual to standardize risk
248
assessments. In addition, risk assessors at the MSOP do not
receive any formal training regarding the constitutional standards
249
for commitment or discharge. Minnesota’s legal standard was not
incorporated into the language of MSOP risk assessments until
250
June 2014.
4.

Failure to Reduce Custody or Discharge Eligible Patients

The MSOP’s stated goal is “to treat and safely reintegrate
251
committed individuals at the MSOP back into the community.”
The program is different than others in the nation in its failure to
reduce custody or discharge eligible patients due to the lack of
treatment progression, the limited less-restrictive options available,
the stark fact that some clients no longer benefit from treatment,
and the complicated petitioning process for a reduction in
252
custody. The combination of each of these explains why the
MSOP is arguably the least effective SOCC treatment program in
the nation.
a.

Lack of Treatment Progression

Clients have historically progressed through the treatment
253
phases of the MSOP very slowly, if at all. As of October 2012, the
MSOP indicated a range of between six to nine years total in
254
treatment for a model client. In contrast, the nationwide average

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 239, at 48.
Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1159.
Id.
Id. at 1159.
Id. at 1161.
Id.
Id. at 1153.
Id. at 1171–72.
Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1156.
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of years spent in a SOCC program is about five to seven. The
MSOP’s indication is not reality, though. Clients are held to
“stringent and perhaps unrealistic expectations for phase
256
movement.” To date, only five individuals have been provisionally
257
discharged from the program. Some clients in the Alternative
Program have been in either Phase I or Phase II for over five
258
years. It has been only in recent years that clients have begun
progressing through the phases of treatment, likely because of the
259
pending Karsjens litigation.
Outside evaluators and assessors have repeatedly voiced
260
concerns about the lack of treatment progression at the MSOP :
Every year since 2006, the Site Visit Auditors have voiced
concerns in all of their evaluation reports to the MSOP
about the disproportionately high number of committed
individuals in Phase I compared to those in Phase III of
the treatment program. In 2011 and 2012, the Site Visit
Auditors reported that “[s]low movement through the
program and the multiple required legislative steps for
discharge in Minnesota hampers program effectiveness”
and that “[t]he lack of clients ‘getting out’ can be
261
demoralizing to clients and staff . . . .”
Indeed, clients at the MSOP feel hopeless about their
prospects of treatment progression and the ultimate goal of
262
discharge. During the Karsjens litigation, an MSOP client testified
263
that he believes that “the only way to get out is to die.” One of the
Karsjens Class Members, Harley Morris, died in the MSOP while on
264
hospice care.

255. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 27.
256. Id. at 44; see Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1149.
257. MSOP FAQs, supra note 5 (click on “Has anyone ever been released from
the program?”). Another individual was released and subsequently recommitted
for noncompliance with the provisional discharge plan, although not for
reoffending. Id.
258. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1157. Arguably, this is due in part to the
MSOP’s failure to differentiate treatment programming. See supra Section II.C.1.
259. See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1157.
260. Id.
261. Id. (alterations in original).
262. Id. at 1151.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1153.
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There are some clients in the MSOP who are at the wrong
265
266
location for treatment or are in the wrong phase of treatment.
MSOP clinicians testified during the Karsjens litigation that there
are some clients who should have been allowed to progress to a
267
later phase of treatment but were not permitted to do so. This
could be because the MSOP is the only SOCC program in the
nation that uses the Matrix factors to determine phase progression,
or because the MSOP has not implemented a system to determine
if clinicians are consistently scoring clients based on the Matrix
268
factors.
Additionally, some clients have regressed in treatment phases
269
due to programming changes the MSOP has implemented. One
MSOP client progressed to the final phase of treatment and was
sent back to the newly implemented Phase I because the MSOP
270
adopted its current three-phase model. “[S]ome individuals have
been confined at the MSOP for over twenty years and have
completed the treatment program three times, but are currently
271
only in Phase II due to subsequent treatment program changes.”
On top of that, MSOP clients do not know what they need to do
and what scores they must maintain to progress to the next phase
272
of treatment.

265. The MSOP has one female patient named Rhonda Bailey. Minnesota is
one of only two states that house female patients with its male counterparts. Ms.
Bailey is in a unit with twenty-two males. She was committed in 1993 and has been
housed in the St. Peter facility since 2008. The MSOP Site Visit Auditors did not
even realize she was housed there until 2014. Until recently, she had group
therapy with men and was denied other treatments. The Rule 706 Expert Report
recommended that Ms. Bailey be transferred or provisionally discharged from the
MSOP to a supervised treatment facility and the Karsjens Plaintiffs motioned to
have Ms. Bailey transferred to a different treatment facility. During the Karsjens
proceedings, Dr. Haley Fox, Clinical Director of the MSOP St. Peter treatment
facility, testified that “it would be optimal if Bailey were placed in a different
facility.” Despite this, the MSOP has not taken any action to implement their
recommendations. Id. at 1151.
266. Id. at 1154.
267. See id. at 1145.
268. See id. at 1156 (“The MSOP did not provide training to all staff on the
Matrix factors until 2013 and 2014, and the MSOP did not provide any training on
the Matrix scoring until 2014.”).
269. Id. at 1158.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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Limited Less-Restrictive Options Available

The MCTA calls for less rights-restrictive options to a
maximum-security facility for those in the MSOP, yet few to no such
273
options exist. Because all clients begin treatment in Phase I, and
the only sites for Phase I treatment are the maximum-security
274
facilities in Moose Lake and St. Peter, they are not afforded the
option available in the MCTA that permits the committing court to
275
place clients in a less-restrictive alternative. Even though many
MSOP clinical staff members have stated that some clients in the
276
program could be safely placed in less-restrictive alternatives, the
277
MSOP lacks alternatives such as halfway houses, transitioning
278
279
housing, and adult foster care.
For those who are actually able to progress to Phase III of the
treatment program, clients often wait years at a high-security facility
because there is not a bed open in the less-restrictive alternative to
280
which they seek to be transferred.
The only less-restrictive
281
alternative is Community Preparation Services (CPS), which takes
282
years to complete.
CPS houses a maximum of thirty-eight
283
clients. In addition to the thirty-eight beds at CPS, “the MSOP has
less than twenty beds available for less-restrictive alternative
284
placements” through contracted services similar to CPS. Between
CPS and the contracted services, there are a maximum of fifty-eight
273. Id. at 1172; see also MINN. STAT. § 253D.07, subdiv. 3 (2014 & Supp. 2015).
274. See supra note 200 and accompanying text; see also infra note 409 and
accompanying text.
275. MINN. STAT. § 253D.07, subdiv. 3; Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1172.
276. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1152. This includes some of the sixty-seven
juvenile-only offenders in the MSOP treatment program. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1152–53.
279. Id.
280. See id. at 1150; Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at
44.
281. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1150. Programming includes “communitybased treatment and maintenance, building pro-social support networks,
participation in support groups, vocational training, budgeting and saving,
volunteering, and demonstrating healthy, pro-social lifestyle choices. . . . While on
campus, CPS clients participate in facility counts and are subject to room searches
and drug testing.” MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., DHS-6316-ENG 1-14, MSOP
PROGRAM REINTEGRATION 1 [hereinafter MSOP REINTEGRATION].
282. See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1150.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1153.
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285

beds available for 726 MSOP clients. This means that only 7.9%
of individuals are permitted to participate in CPS or its contracted
counterpart, and that the number of beds available is
disproportionate to the population of those who are eligible for
286
transfer to a less-restrictive facility.
c.

Some Clients at the MSOP No Longer Benefit from
Treatment
287

Some MSOP clients no longer benefit from treatment. Both
physicians who testified during the Karsjens proceedings and Site
Visit Auditors who visited the MSOP identified clients who had
reached the maximum benefit of treatment and would no longer
288
benefit from sex offender treatment in a high-security setting.
Unlike other states in the nation, the MSOP does not have a
289
classification to express treatment completion.
Other states have created delineated ends to their SOCC
290
programs to signify completion of treatment. Florida created
language such as “maximum treatment benefit” in its programming
to indicate that its clients have received the full extent of treatment
291
services and no longer benefit from programming. In addition,
Wisconsin statutorily defined this objective as “significant progress
in treatment” to denote that clients who were sufficiently successful
in inpatient treatment be considered for less-restrictive supervised
292
release into the community.
d.

Difficult Petitioning Process for a Reduction in Custody

Clients at the MSOP are permitted to petition for a reduction
in custody to a less-restrictive facility or to be provisionally
293
discharged. The Executive Director of the MSOP may petition for
a reduction of custody or a provisional discharge on behalf of a

285. Id. at 1150, 1153. See generally MSOP FAQs, supra note 5.
286. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1153, 1158.
287. Id. at 1158.
288. See id.
289. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 37.
290. See id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1161 (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.27, subdivs.
1–2 (2014 & Supp. 2015)).
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client as well. The first step in this process is to file a petition with
295
the Special Review Board (SRB).
MSOP clients must wait six months after their initial
296
commitment to the MSOP to petition the SRB. Clients who
previously petitioned to the SRB and were denied a reduction in
custody or a provisional discharge must wait until six months has
passed since the previous decision until they are permitted to begin
297
the petitioning process again. The same time frame applies to the
298
Executive Director petitioning on behalf of a client.
After the client or the Executive Director petition to the SRB,
299
the MSOP schedules a SRB hearing for the client. The SRB
consists of professionals appointed by the Commissioner of the
300
Department of Human Services. The SRB holds up to sixteen
301
hearings per month, which are held in the order they are
302
As of June 2014, there were 105 pending SRB
received.
303
petitions. Petitions filed after January 2010 had an average wait
time of 224.3 days from when the petition was filed to the date the
304
SRB hearing took place. After the hearing, the SRB must issue a
report recommending or denying the client’s petition for discharge
305
or a reduction in custody within 30 days.
If the SRB denies the client’s petition, the client may petition
to the Minnesota Supreme Court Appeals Panel (SCAP) for a
306
rehearing. The SCAP is the only body that has legal authority to
307
grant provisional discharges or a reduction in custody. The SCAP
294. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.27, subdivs. 1–2).
295. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.27, subdivs. 1–2).
296. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.27, subdiv. 2); see also Expert Report and
Recommendations, supra note 41, at 38.
297. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1161 (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.27, subdiv.
2); see also Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 38.
298. See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1161 (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.27,
subdiv. 2).
299. Id. at 1163.
300. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 38.
301. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1163.
302. Id. at 1161.
303. Id. at 1163; Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76.
304. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76.
305. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1161 (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.27, subdivs.
3–4 (2014 & Supp. 2015)).
306. Id. at 1160; Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76.
307. See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1161; Expert Report and
Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76.
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hearing is statutorily required to be held “within 180 days of the
filing of the petition [with the SCAP] unless an extension is
308
granted for good cause.” If the client or the MSOP does not file
for a rehearing with the SCAP within thirty days, the SCAP will
adopt the SRB’s recommendations and the client must start the
309
process over.
Unlike the initial civil commitment hearings, the client has the
310
burden of proof at the SCAP rehearing.
The client “must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer is
311
appropriate.” Additional difficulties MSOP clients face during the
petitioning process are: discharge criteria that are more stringent
312
and harder to prove than the commitment criteria; the lag in
313
time between a SCAP hearing and a SCAP decision; the MSOP’s
failure to provide legal assistance to those who cannot navigate the
314
complex petitioning process; and the reality that clients are
required to petition to two boards, the SRB and the SCAP, even
though the SRB cannot make any legal determinations regarding a
315
client’s reduction in custody or provisional discharge.
Another factor that makes the petitioning process burdensome
is that the MSOP does not actively petition on behalf of clients even
316
though current law permits it. Clients, rather than the MSOP, are

308. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1161 (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.28, subdiv.
1(b)).
309. See id. at 1161–62.
310. Id. at 1162 (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.28, subdiv. 2(d)); Expert Report
and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76.
311. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1162 (citing MINN. STAT. 253D.28, subdiv.
2(e)).
312. Id.; Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76.
313. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76; see also
Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1163; Expert Report and Recommendations, supra
note 41, at 6.
314. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76, 78.
315. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1161; Expert Report and Recommendations,
supra note 41, at 38, 76.
316. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 78.
Taking an active role in petitioning is important for several reasons:
(1) some clients may not have the cognitive ability to understand the
discharge/petitioning process; (2) current mental health practices
require practitioners to ensure clients are treated in the least restrictive
environment; (3) MSOP administration has an ethical obligation to
release individuals who no longer meet the criteria for SOCC in order
to ensure that client civil liberties are protected; and (4) research
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burdened with the responsibility of petitioning for release rather
than the MSOP petitioning for the release of individuals who are
317
eligible for a reduction in custody or for discharge. Although the
MSOP does not play an active role in the petitioning process, it has
318
a strong influence on the process. Very often, the SRB and SCAP
will not grant a decrease in custody or a provisional discharge
319
unless the MSOP supports it.
Minnesota’s system for reduction in custody differs from that
of other SOCC states:
Instead of a bifurcated reduction in custody process, most
states require clients to be evaluated on an annual or
every two years basis to determine whether clients
continue to meet the commitment criteria. A hearing is
then held, in which the state typically has the burden to
show (usually by clear and convincing evidence) that the
client continues to require civil commitment. These
hearings are held within reasonable time-frames of the
annual reviews as to ensure that clients not meeting
commitment criteria are not detained longer than
320
necessary.
In addition, other SOCC programs do not have an SRB or
equivalent, and instead have one body for judicial review, such as
321
the SCAP.
e.

The MSOP Lags Behind Other SOCC Treatment Programs
in the Nation

The MSOP is very different from other SOCC treatment
programs in the nation by its failure to reduce custody or discharge
eligible patients, the limited availability of less-restrictive options, its
indicates that the intensity and targets of interventions should match
the risk and needs of clients—allowing clients to receive too much
treatment for too long may actually jeopardize public safety.
Id. at 69.
317. See id. at 48, 69, 76.
318. See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1162.
319. See id; see also Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at
37–38 (“In order for a client at MSOP to be judged as ready for possible release,
the client’s clinical team must agree that he/she has achieved consistent mastery
on the Matrix Factors, coding of which previous reviewers and evaluators have
found to be unreliable.”).
320. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76.
321. Id. at 73.
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failure to do anything for clients who no longer benefit from
treatment, and the difficult petitioning process for a reduction in
322
These deficiencies result in a number of alarming
custody.
323
statistics.
First, Minnesota boasts “the highest per-capita population of
324
civilly committed sex offenders in the nation.” Currently, the
325
MSOP has 726 civilly committed patients, which is a rate of
approximately 129.4 civilly committed individuals per million
326
residents. Comparatively, Wisconsin, which began its system in
1994 very close to the time when the MSOP began, currently has a
327
population of 362 clients. Wisconsin’s overall commitment rate is
approximately 53.7 commitments per million residents, North
Dakota’s rate is 77.8 per million, California’s and New York’s rates
328
are 15 per million, and Florida’s rate is 29 per million. As of
2014, Minnesota’s clients made up approximately 15% of the
329
nation’s population of civilly committed sex offenders.
Second, MSOP clients spend more years on average in civil
330
commitment. Although the number of years spent in SOCC
treatment programs varies nationwide depending on the program,
331
the average stay is five to seven years. As of October 2012, the
phase progression timeline for clients in the MSOP ranged from six
332
to nine years for full completion of Phases I through III. In
reality, civil commitment to the MSOP takes much longer to

322. See supra Section III.C.4.e.
323. See supra Section III.C.4.e.
324. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1148; see also Expert Report and
Recommendations, supra note 41, at 74–75 (noting that this is “a number that, per
capita, is significantly higher than any other SOCC state”).
325. MSOP FAQs, supra note 5; see also Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1148 (“The
state projects that the number of civilly committed sex offenders will grow to 1215
by 2022.”).
326. Cf. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 75.
327. Id. at 89–90.
328. Id. at 75 (citing SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 239, at 6).
329. Of the seventeen programs that responded to the 2014 SOCCPN Survey,
Minnesota’s program had the highest overall number of civilly committed
individuals. At the time, Minnesota had 697 of the 4658 total sex offenders civilly
committed nationwide. SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 239, at 6–7.
330. Compare Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1156, with Expert Report and
Recommendations, supra note 41, at 27.
331. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 27.
332. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1156.
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complete than the MSOP’s stated timeframe. Some clients in the
333
MSOP have been civilly committed for more than twenty years.
Third, the MSOP has the lowest discharge rate of any SOCC
334
program in the nation. To date, the MSOP has conditionally
discharged five individuals and has not unconditionally discharged
335
Unlike Minnesota, Wisconsin has unconditionally
anyone.
336
discharged 118 individuals and has conditionally released around
337
135 individuals. There are currently 39 individuals on supervised
338
release in Wisconsin—the others have been fully discharged. New
339
York has unconditionally discharged 30 individuals
and has
340
conditionally released 185 individuals, while Washington has
conditionally released 70 individuals and has unconditionally
341
discharged 40 people.
IV. THE KARSJENS CASE
While SOCC has a place in the spectrum of options for
combatting sexual violence, Minnesota has failed to provide a
system that protects the rights of individuals to receive
constitutional treatment and to be free from an overreaching
program that captures many but releases none. The Karsjens case
provides an opportunity to reform our policies—and to bring
SOCC back to the size and parameters that it should be to be an
effective tool.
A.

Background

There have been many challenges to Minnesota’s Sex
342
Offender Civil Commitment laws. In 2012, Judge Davis of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota stayed suits that
333. Id. at 1157; see also Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41,
at 47 (“Many clients have been in treatment for 15 years or longer.”).
334. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1147.
335. E.g., MSOP FAQs, supra note 5; Expert Report and Recommendations,
supra note 41, at 65; see also, e.g., Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1147.
336. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 67.
337. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1147.
338. See Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 94.
339. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1147; SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note
239, at 14.
340. SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 239, at 13.
341. Id. at 13–14.
342. E.g., Janus & Brandt, supra note 110.
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posed constitutional questions about Minnesota’s civil commitment
343
of sex offenders. Shortly thereafter, the firm Gustafson Gluek
344
agreed to represent the MSOP patients pro bono.
The named plaintiffs in the Karsjens case are fourteen men
345
currently housed in the MSOP. After Judge Frank certified the
346
class, all clients currently housed at the MSOP were incorporated.
The plaintiffs filed suit against Minnesota Department of Human
347
Services personnel in their official capacities. A key point about
the Karsjens case and its implications is that this case is about the
entire system in Minnesota—a much broader challenge than the
kinds of individual relief that Minnesota courts have previously
addressed in the context of SOCC litigation.
“The court . . . oversaw extensive attempted settlement
348
negotiations,” which were to no avail. It also “denied the majority
of a motion to dismiss, [and] appointed an expert panel to review
349
client case files.” Finally, the court ordered that the Minnesota
Department of Human Services Commissioner, Lucinda Jesson,
create a task force of national experts and stakeholders in the
350
case, which included Professor Eric Janus of Mitchell Hamline
351
352
School of Law, a county attorney, and a former chief justice of
353
the Minnesota Supreme Court, amongst others. The task force’s
charge was to:

343. Karsjens v. Jesson, 283 F.R.D. 514, 516 (D. Minn. 2012); Janus & Brandt,
supra note 110.
344. Janus & Brandt, supra note 110.
345. Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F. Supp. 3d 916, 922 (D. Minn. 2014).
346. Id. at 924 (citing Karsjens, 283 F.R.D. at 520); see Janus & Brandt, supra
note 110.
347. Karsjens, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 916.
348. See Janus & Brandt, supra note 110.
349. Id.
350. Chris Serres, Backlash Grows Against Sex Offender Program, STAR TRIB. (Nov.
18, 2014), http://www.startribune.com/experts-call-for-expedited-review-of-minn
-sex-offender-cases/283057251/; Janus & Brandt, supra note 110; see also Karsjens,
6 F. Supp. 3d at 924.
351. See Chris Serres, Sex Offenders Demand Broad Reforms of Minnesota’s Troubled
Treatment Program, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.startribune.com/sex
-offenders-demand-broad-reforms-of-minnesota-s-troubled-treatment-program
/322353341.
352. See Ostrem, supra note 177, at 698.
353. See Eric Magnuson, Former Chief Justice of Minnesota, Selected for Key Role in
Sex Offender Lawsuit, STAR TRIB. (July 24, 2015), http://www.startribune.com
/former-minnesota-supreme-court-chief-magnuson-picked-for-key-role-in-sex
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“examine and provide recommended legislative proposals
to the Commissioner” on each of the following topics: (1)
“[t]he civil commitment and referral process for sex
offenders”; (2) “[SOCC] options that are less restrictive
than placement in a secure treatment facility”; and (3)
“[t]he standards and processes for the reduction in
354
custody for civilly committed sex offenders.”
B.

Arguments

It is important to understand Defendants’ and Plaintiffs’
arguments for and against the constitutionality of the MCTA and its
relation to the MSOP in order to understand concerns at stake for
both parties. This case encompasses the dilemma between the
questions of constitutionality and the State’s interests in public
safety and the status quo of what has been the MSOP for nearly
twenty years. The constitutional question of the case was, with over
700 men (and one woman) civilly committed, and only five people
having been provisionally discharged in the previous twenty years,
was the purpose of Minnesota’s commitment of sex offenders
355
punitive or legitimate?
1.

Plaintiffs’ Arguments

Plaintiffs answered this constitutional question by arguing that
the very statistics of the lack of release were a guiding factor of the
constitutionality of the MCTA:
Of course, the key fact that overwhelms all others is that
“no one ever gets out.” In the more than [twenty] years
since the current statute was enacted, not one single
person has been successfully treated for the purpose of
“rendering further supervision unnecessary” (i.e. fully
discharged from the program) which is the primary
requirement of the statute . . . . That is the key issue . . .
because this statute and the program that applies it delays,
-offender-lawsuit/318368841. The Honorable Eric J. Magnuson wrote the task
force’s final report and was a part of the task force. See TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT,
supra note 184, at 1.
354. Karsjens, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 924. The task force issued its final
recommendations on December 3, 2012. See TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note
184, at 1.
355. Janus & Brandt, supra note 110; see also Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d
1139, 1144 (D. Minn. 2015).
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and therefore deprives, Class Members of their liberty . . .
a fundamental right under the United States
356
Constitution.
More specifically related to Plaintiffs’ facial challenge was
evidence offered that regular forensic risk assessments are
necessary to determine whether Class Members continue to meet
357
requirements for continued treatment. The statute does not
358
contain a provision requiring annual risk assessments. The only
formal risk assessment that is done at MSOP occurs as a part of the
359
petitioning for release process. Because there is no annual risk
assessment, the current commitment status of hundreds of
360
Plaintiffs has never been reviewed. Testimony at the trial also
established that MSOP knows there are Plaintiffs who meet the
reduction-in-custody criteria or no longer meet commitment
361
criteria but who remain confined in the program.
Plaintiffs argued that there is no judicial bypass process to the
362
statutory reduction-in-custody process. There is a single process
to obtain transfer, provisional release, or full discharge, which leads
to issues with due process, as some clients are committed who no
363
longer should be. The process currently in place is fatally flawed
364
and unconstitutionally implemented. Plaintiffs believe that the
process takes too long and denies clients services necessary to
365
navigate the process.
Finally, the Plaintiffs argued that in order to pass
constitutional muster by living up to the statutorily stated purpose
of commitment, the statute must “require the MSOP to [take
affirmative action and] file a petition on behalf of a patient
[particularly given the diminished capacity of the Class Members]

356. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139.
357. Id.
358. Id. See generally MINN. STAT. § 253D (2014).
359. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139. Most other states have at least annual
forensic evaluations of patients, completed to continually assess their treatment
needs and readiness for release. OLA EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 178, at 85.
360. See Janus, supra note 33, at 5.
361. Id. at 6.
362. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment at 10, Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (No. 11-cv-03659),
2015 WL 3792764.
363. See id. at 22–23.
364. Id.
365. Id.
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any time it has a [substantial] reason to believe that the patient
meets the criteria for a reduction in custody or no longer meets the
366
commitment criteria.”
In addition, the American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota
367
and Eric Janus filed an amicus brief in support of Plaintiffs. Their
focus on the implementation of the scheme provides authority for
368
the court to make a ruling of facial unconstitutionality. The focus
of their argument was whether MSOP is a “bona fide civil
369
commitment program.” They argued that in order to be a bona
fide program, the State’s purpose may not be the forbidden
370
purpose of punishment. “The legitimacy of the criminal law
requires that its distinctive purposes—to punish and deter—be
forbidden to the [S]tate outside of the criminal law. This is the
371
essence of substantive due process.” The amicus brief highlighted
for the court that this situation provides a unique and important
372
opportunity for system-wide reform—not just individual relief.
The court “has before it two decades of executive and judicial
373
implementation, and legislative acquiesce.” Here, according to
the amici brief, the court can look at the “true purpose and
character of the MSOP scheme to determine whether the MSOP is
a legitimate civil commitment scheme, or is, instead, an elaborate
pretext for imposing punishment without the constraints of the
374
criminal justice system.”
2.

Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants asserted that the MCTA is not unconstitutional
because of the holding in an Eighth Circuit case, Strutton v.
375
Meade. In that case, the court ruled that individuals in Missouri’s
sex offender program did not have a “fundamental right to
treatment” because the “professional standards” rubric from

366. Id. at 23.
367. See Brief of Amici Curiae Eric S. Janus and ACLU-MN, Karsjens, 109 F.
Supp. 3d 1139 (No. 11-cv-03659).
368. Id. at 4, 21.
369. Id. at 12, 31.
370. Id. at 5.
371. Id. at 6.
372. See id. at 24.
373. Id. at 11.
374. Id. at 11–12.
375. 668 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2012).
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376

Youngberg v. Romeo did not apply.
Instead, “a ‘shock the
conscience’ standard applies for judgment” regarding any “right to
377
treatment claims.” This means that any lack of treatment faced by
MSOP patients must be “so arbitrary or egregious as to shock the
378
conscience.”
Because of the holding in Strutton, Defendants
argued that the MCTA does not shock the conscience to a point of
379
unconstitutionality.
C.

Holding

The Karsjens trial began in February of 2015. After six weeks of
testimony and arguments, Judge Frank found the MSOP both
facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional in its implementation
for twelve specific deficiencies in the MCTA itself and its
380
implementation via the MSOP.
1.

Facially Unconstitutional

On June 15, 2015, Judge Frank ruled that the MCTA, codified
381
as Minnesota Statutes section 253D, is facially unconstitutional.
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
substantive due process applies to the Plaintiffs’ claim because the
MSOP “interferes with the rights implicit in the concept of ordered
382
liberty.” Substantive due process requires civilly committed sex
offenders must be “mentally ill and pose a substantial danger to the
383
public as a result of that mental illness.” The court applied strict
scrutiny because “Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to live free of

376. ERIC JANUS, MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES UNDERLYING THE CLAIMS MADE IN KARSJENS (2012), https://mn.gov
/dhs/images/Points-and-authorities.pdf.
377. Id.
378. Strutton, 668 F.3d at 558.
379. See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary
Judgment at 44, Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (D. Minn. 2015) (No.
11-cv-03659), 2014 WL 9910329.
380. E.g. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1173–74; Chris Serres, Minnesota Sex
Offender Program Is Ruled Unconstitutional, STAR TRIB. (June 17, 2015, 11:43PM),
http://www.startribune.com/judge-expected-to-rule-today-in-lawsuit-challenging
-minnesota-s-sex-offender-program/307884871.
381. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1139.
382. Id. at 1166 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)).
383. Id. (emphasis added) (first citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77
(1992); then citing Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995)).
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physical restraint is constrained by the curtailment of their
384
liberty.” The court concluded that the state failed to meet its
burden to show that the MCTA is narrowly tailored to achieve the
385
state’s compelling governmental interest in protecting the public.
Judge Frank found the MCTA to be facially unconstitutional
386
for six reasons. First, the MCTA is not narrowly tailored because
it does not require periodic assessments to determine if MSOP
committees satisfy the statutory requirements for civil
387
commitment. For example, in Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme
Court cited Kansas’ yearly risk assessments required under the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act in upholding its
388
constitutionality. Kansas used yearly risk assessments to determine
if committees continue to pose a danger to the public, have a
mental abnormality, and need continued treatment for a sexual
389
disorder. The MCTA, however, does not require periodic risk
assessments to determine if committees continue to satisfy the
390
statutory requirements of the MCTA.
Because the MCTA does not require periodic risk assessments,
it cannot determine if MSOP inmates continue to be mentally ill,
which, according to the statute, influences whether the individual is
391
likely to reoffend (creating a danger to the public). Substantive
due process requires that a civilly committed individual must be
mentally ill and pose a substantial danger to the public as the result
392
of that mental illness. The MCTA is therefore not narrowly
tailored and violates substantive due process.
Second, the MCTA is facially unconstitutional “because it fails
to provide a judicial bypass mechanism to the statutory reduction
393
in custody process.” MSOP civil committees are only allowed to
394
be provisionally or fully discharged by the SRB and SCAP. As
384. Id. at 1167 (citations omitted).
385. Id. at 1168.
386. Id. at 1168–70.
387. Id. at 1168; supra Section III.C.3.
388. 521 U.S. 346, 363–64 (1997).
389. Id.
390. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1159; supra Section III.C.3. This creates
questions of constitutionality under Hendricks. See 521 U.S. at 363–64.
391. See supra Section III.C.4.d.
392. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1159 (first citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71, 77 (1992); then citing Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995)).
393. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1168–69.
394. MINN. STAT. §§ 253B.18, subdiv. 4c, 253B.19; Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at
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previously noted, the process of appealing to the SRB and SCAP is
395
and frequently takes more than five
long and cumbersome
396
years.
A judicial bypass option, on the other hand, would permit
MSOP patients to be heard more rapidly. Additionally, MSOP
patients are not afforded counsel to help them wade the waters of
397
the SRB/SCAP appeals process. Judge Frank ruled that because
the MCTA does not include an emergency mechanism to bypass
the lengthy SRB/SCAP process, the law is facially unconstitutional
398
because patients are not heard in a “reasonable time.” Because
the SRB/SCAP appeals process may take many years, during which
time a civilly committed individual may no longer be mentally ill or
399
dangerous yet still deprived of their liberty, the MCTA is facially
unconstitutional because it does not provide for a judicial bypass
400
option.
Third, the MCTA is facially unconstitutional because the
statutory criteria for release are more stringent than the criteria for
401
commitment. The MCTA requires the offender be “highly likely
402
to reoffend” when committed. Conversely, the release criteria
establish a much higher standard—they require the individual to
403
“no longer be dangerous.” If an individual is committed under a
statutory standard, that person cannot be committed if they no
longer meet that statutory standard without violating substantive
404
due process. Because it is possible for an individual to no longer
be “highly likely to reoffend” yet not meet the indisputable
standard of “no longer be[ing] dangerous,” the MCTA violates
substantive due process, is facially unconstitutional, and results in a
405
punitive effect contrary to the purpose of civil commitment.

1168.
395. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1168; see supra Section III.C.4.d.
396. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1163; see supra Section III.C.4.d.
397. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1163; see supra Section III.C.4.d.
398. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1168–69; see supra Section III.C.4.d.
399. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1163, 1168–69; see supra Section III.C.4.d.
400. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1168–69.
401. Id. at 1169; see also Ostrem, supra note 177, at 698 (calling the MSOP “a
system with a pretty robust entry point and no realistic exit”).
402. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1169.
403. Id.
404. See id.
405. Id.
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Fourth, the MCTA is facially unconstitutional because the
SRB/SCAP appeals process requires the offender to maintain the
burden in proving that he or she is no longer dangerous or needs
406
treatment for a mental disorder. When a fundamental right is
involved, laws are subject to strict scrutiny under Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process, which requires the state to
bear the burden of proving that the law is narrowly tailored to serve
407
a compelling state interest. Judge Frank concluded the burden of
proof for maintaining commitment should remain on the state
from the initial commitment proceedings through the appeals
408
process. The state is required to “demonstrat[e] the justification
for continued confinement by clear and convincing evidence . . .”
at all times instead of putting the burden on MSOP patients, as the
409
MCTA does. Because the MCTA requires patients to demonstrate
they are no longer mentally ill or are no longer a danger to the
public, the MCTA is not narrowly tailored and results in a punitive
410
effect contrary to the goal of civil commitment.
Fifth, the MCTA is facially unconstitutional because it provides
for less-rights-restrictive treatment centers, yet no such places
411
exist. MSOP has but three facilities: the high security center in
Moose Lake, MN; an additional high security center in St. Peter,
412
MN; and the CPS in St. Peter, MN.
The only less-rights-restrictive option available to MSOP
patients in either of the two high security centers is the CPS, which
is deficient in its capacity to house the number of individuals who
406. Id. For example, during a SCAP rehearing, “[t]he petitioning party
seeking discharge or provisional discharge bears the burden of going forward with
the evidence . . . to show that the person is entitled to the requested relief.” MINN.
STAT. § 253D.28, subdiv. 2(d) (2014 & Supp. 2015).
407. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1166–67 (first citing Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal citations and quotations omitted)
(“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment forbids the government to infringe . . .
fundamental liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”); then
citing Gallagher v. City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal
citations omitted) (noting that, where legislation infringes upon a fundamental
right, such legislation “must survive strict scrutiny—the law must be ‘narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest’”).
408. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1169.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.; see also supra Section III.C.4.b.
412. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1150; JOHNSTON, supra note 58.
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413

likely qualify for transfer to CPS. This certainly does not mean
that all MSOP patients should be transferred to less-restrictive
facilities; it merely means that the number of beds available should
be equivalent to the population of those who are eligible for
transfer to a less-restrictive facility. Moreover, the only available lessrights-restrictive alternative, CPS, is located on the same campus as
the high security center in St. Peter, MN, and the two are barely
414
separated by barbed wire fences. In addition, CPS programming
takes years to complete, and because of the limited number of beds
available, some committed offenders wait for years at a time in a
unit through which they have previously progressed because there
is not a bed open in the less-restrictive building to which they seek
415
to be transferred.
Furthermore, the MCTA requires that individual patients
petitioning for provisional discharge to a less-rights-restrictive
facility show that they should be transferred to a “facility [that] best
416
meet[s] [their] needs.” This is impossible because only one lessrights-restrictive treatment facility, CPS, exists, and the one that
417
does exist houses only fifty-eight beds. Because of this, the MCTA
violates substantive due process, resulting in a punitive effect for
418
civilly committed sex offenders.
Finally, the MCTA is facially unconstitutional because it lacks
affirmative action by the state to petition for a committed
offender’s release if the offender no longer satisfies the statutory
419
requirements for civil commitment in the MSOP.
Despite
knowledge that some of its patients no longer satisfy the statutory
requirement for civil commitment, “the MSOP has never
petitioned on behalf of a committed individual for full
420
discharge.” The MSOP has petitioned on behalf of only seven

413. See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1150.
414. MSOP REINTEGRATION, supra note 281, at 1; see also Briana Bierschbach,
The Minnesota Sex Offender Program, Explained, MINN. POST (July 22, 2014), https://
www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2014/07/minnesota-sex-offender-program
-explained.
415. See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1150.
416. MINN. STAT. § 253D.29, subdiv. 1 (2014); Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at
1169; see also supra Section III.C.4.b.
417. Supra Section III.C.4.b.
418. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1169.
419. Id.; see also supra Section III.C.4.b.
420. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1164; see also supra Section III.C.4.b.
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421

patients for partial discharge.
Instead, the vast majority of
422
committed offenders must initiate their own proceedings.
Therefore, the MCTA is not narrowly tailored to meet the state’s
compelling interest because it does not require the MSOP to take
affirmative steps to initiate the process for a reduction in custody of
423
civilly committed individuals. Judge Frank called this a “fatal flaw”
of the statute—it results in a punitive effect, which is “contrary to
424
the purpose of civil commitment.”
Judge Frank’s ruling in Karsjens v. Jesson cited six reasons why
425
the MCTA is facially unconstitutional. Arguably, the Minnesota
Legislature was hasty in its revision of the MCTA in response to the
public outcry and significant media attention Linehan’s case
garnered when the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in Linehan I
that he did not meet the statutory requirement for civil
426
commitment under the Pearson test. Some of the current defects
are in the text itself as written, and some defects are the result of
the Minnesota Legislature’s failure to include certain provisions in
the text of the statute. Each reason demonstrates a fault in the
MCTA that desperately needs to be repaired in order to mend the
broken system that is the MSOP.

421. See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1164; see also supra Section III.C.4.b. The
MSOP petitioned on behalf of six individuals who were supposed to be
provisionally released, but whose provisional release never happened, because the
facility they were scheduled to be provisionally discharged to was the Cambridge
facility, which was never opened. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1164. Governor Mark
Dayton halted Cambridge’s launch in November of 2013. Id. at 1152. In a letter to
the Minnesota Department of Human Services Director, Lucinda Jesson, Governor
Dayton directed her
to suspend DHS’ plans to transfer any sex offenders to a less restrictive
facility such as Cambridge until: (1) the Task Force issued its findings
and recommendations; (2) the legislature had the opportunity to
review existing statutes and make any necessary revisions; and (3) the
legislature and the Governor’s Administration have agreed to and
provided sufficient funding for the additional facilities, programs, and
staff necessary for the program’s successful implementation.
Id. The six individuals were never provisionally discharged, and the Cambridge
facility never opened. Id. at 1164. So, in reality, the MSOP has successfully
petitioned for the conditional release of a single patient. See id.
422. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1164.
423. Id. at 1169.
424. Id. at 1168.
425. Id. at 1168–70.
426. Supra notes 140–41, 145 and accompanying text.
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Unconstitutional as Applied

In addition to the number of reasons the MCTA is facially
unconstitutional, Judge Frank ruled the statute is unconstitutional
427
as applied (in implementation) for an additional six reasons
because “Defendants apply the statute in a manner that results in
Plaintiffs being confined to the MSOP beyond such time as they
either meet the statutory reduction in custody criteria or no longer
428
satisfy the constitutional threshold for continued commitment.”
First, the MCTA is unconstitutional in its implementation
because “Defendants do not conduct periodic risk assessments of
429
civilly committed individuals at the MSOP.” As previously stated,
430
this presents serious issues of constitutionality. During the trial,
various MSOP psychologists and defendants stated they were
unsure if all of the civilly committed offenders met the statutory
431
criteria for commitment. Although the MCTA does not require
432
periodic risk assessments, the statute also does not prohibit them.
433
Periodic risk assessments are generally valid for only one year,
and many offenders have not had a risk assessment completed
since their initial proceedings to determine if they continue to be
mentally ill and pose a substantial danger to the public because of
their mental illness.
In the only case on which the Supreme Court has ruled
regarding the conditions of sex offender confinement, it stated that
Washington State must “implement a treatment program for
residents containing elements required by prevailing professional
434
standards.” As previously discussed, the vast majority of states with
SOCC programs conduct annual risk assessments on all offender
435
patients. The American Psychological Association cites annual
427. See supra Section III.A (discussing the change in the implementation of
the MCTA because of the case of Alfonso Rodriguez, Jr.).
428. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1170.
429. Id.; supra notes 384, 387–89 and accompanying text.
430. Compare supra Section II.A.1, with supra Section II.A.2.
431. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d, at 1159, 1170.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 1159.
434. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 266 (2001). Although dicta, this quote is a
helpful guidepost in helping states develop constitutionally sound practices in
their civil commitment of sex offenders.
435. Supra note 244 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-3708 (West, Westlaw through 2015); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.8 (West, Westlaw
through 2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08 (West, Westlaw through 2015); Karsjens,
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psychiatric risk assessments of institutionalized individuals as a best
practice for practitioners—a “prevailing professional standard.”
436
Minnesota does not conduct the annual risk assessments as
required among the prevailing standards of other states’ civil
commitment programs as well as the American Psychological
Association prevailing professional standards.
Additionally, psychological standards require the differentiated
risk assessment of individuals based on the group or groups to
437
which they belong. For example, the MSOP uses the same risk
assessment tools for males, its one female patient, adolescents, and
438
individuals with developmental disabilities. Arguably, the MSOP
is required to conduct annual risk assessments that mimic the
majority of other states because it is the prevailing professional
439
standard outlined in Seling v. Young. Because the MSOP does not
do so, it results in a punitive effect, which is contrary to the goal of
440
civil commitment and unconstitutional.
Second, the MCTA is unconstitutional in its implementation
because the MSOP has not been conducting the risk assessments
441
“in a constitutional manner.” Not only have risk assessors not
received any formal training on the MCTA legal standard that must
be met for an individual’s continued commitment, but also, they
have not been applying the correct legal standard under the
442
MCTA. The correct legal standard is the Call standard, which
requires that a person be “confined for only so long as he or she
109 F. Supp. 3d at 1159 (“As of 2011, Minnesota and Massachusetts were the only
two states that did not require annual reports to the courts regarding each sex
offender’s continuing need to be committed.”); GRANT CUMMINGS, WIS.
LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSONS:
INFORMAL
PAPER
6
(2013),
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications
/informationalpapers/documents/2013/54_civil%20commitment%20of
%20sexually%20violent%20persons.pdf.
436. Supra note 243 and accompanying text. Minnesota does not conduct
periodic risk assessments of civilly committed sex offenders, even though the
statutory scheme for general civil commitment permits it. MINN. STAT. § 253B.03,
subdiv. 5 (2014).
437. See, e.g., Anthony Beech, Dawn D. Fisher & David Thornton, Risk
Assessment of Sex Offenders, 34 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 339, 347–48 (2003); supra
Section III(C)(1).
438. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1160.
439. See Seling, 531 U.S. at 266.
440. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1170.
441. Id.
442. Id.
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continues both to need further inpatient treatment and supervision
443
for his sexual disorder and to pose a danger to the public.”
During the Karsjens proceedings, a forensic evaluator for the
444
MSOP, Dr. Anne Pascucci, admitted she had previously not used
445
the Call standard for patient discharge. MSOP risk assessors did
not begin to use this standard until after the Karsjens case started in
446
2011.
Therefore, the MCTA is unconstitutional in its
implementation through the MSOP because it does not apply the
447
correct legal standards set forth in Call.
Third, the MCTA is unconstitutional in its implementation
because there are some MSOP clients who have completed
448
treatment and remain confined at MSOP, even though they no
449
longer benefit from treatment. This is likely because of the
programming changes the MSOP has implemented over the years,
in which some patients have had to restart treatment when new
450
programming is implemented. Because the MSOP’s three-phase
program has undergone many programming changes in its history,
some individuals have completed three different programs, and
451
have not been released. Therefore, the MCTA is unconstitutional
as applied because it is not narrowly tailored in its confinement of
individuals, some of whom should not remain civilly committed to
452
the MSOP.
Fourth, the MCTA is unconstitutional in its implementation
because the discharge process is “not working as [it] should at the
453
MSOP.” As stated previously, the MSOP refuses to “petition on
454
behalf” of individuals who are near the end of treatment. Even
after court proceedings in the Karsjens suit commenced,
Defendants had yet to address the delays in the “reduction-of455
custody” process.
The court also found the MSOP did not
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.

Id. (quoting Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995)).
Id. at 1159.
Id. at 1170.
Id. at 1171.
Id.
Id. at 1158, 1171.
Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1158.
Id. at 1171.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1171–72; see also supra Section III.C.2.b.
Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1171; see also supra Section III.C.2.b.
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provide discharge and reintegration planning until committed
456
457
individuals were in Phase III, the final phase of treatment.
Discharge and reintegration services and programming should
be given to patients throughout their treatment at the MSOP,
because the goal of the program is to provide treatment and
successfully reintegrate individuals into the community after their
458
treatment. Because committees are not given the reintegration
and discharge tools they need from the beginning of their
treatment at the MSOP, if and when individuals are released, their
toolbox will be emptier than if they had received the tools from day
one. Moreover, the MSOP’s failure to equip committees with the
proper tools from the beginning of their treatment is contrary to
the underlying purpose of the MSOP treatment program—“[t]o
promote public safety by providing comprehensive treatment and
reintegration opportunities for civilly-committed [sic] sexual
459
abusers.”
By refusing to petition on behalf of those who continue to be
civilly committed, and who likely should be provisionally
discharged, the MSOP has done nothing to remedy this problem.
Reintegration and discharge programming is not provided to
committees until Phase III of treatment programming, and the
resulting delay in provisional discharge means the MCTA is
460
unconstitutional as applied.
Fifth, the MCTA is unconstitutional in its implementation
because the MSOP does not provide for less-restrictive alternatives
461
than high-security treatment centers. The statute permits the
462
MSOP to use less-restrictive alternatives, but none exist. Instead,
all committed individuals must start in a high-security facility, and
463
gradually progress to a less-restrictive facility. The MSOP lacks

456.
457.
458.
459.

Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1171; see also supra Section III.B.2.
Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1153.
See MSOP REINTEGRATION, supra note 281, at 1.
SHELBY R. RICHARDSON, MINN. SEX OFFENDER PROGRAM, TREATMENT
PROGRESSION 1 (2016), http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/groups/agencywide
/documents/pub/dhs16_167938.pdf.
460. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1171–72.
461. See, e.g., id. at 1169; see also supra Section III.C.2.b.
462. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1169; see also supra Section III.C.2.b.
463. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1151–52 (“There is no alternative placement
option to allow individuals to be placed in a less restrictive facility at the time of
their initial commitment to the MSOP.”).
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traditional, less-restrictive alternatives, such as halfway houses, for
464
those who began their treatment in a high-security facility.
The sixth and final reason the MCTA is unconstitutional in its
implementation is because there is no significant relationship
between the treatment that individuals receive and the discharge
465
rate. The aforementioned phases of treatment do not all involve
treatment for an underlying mental illness, and some of the phases
466
primarily focus on rule compliance. The extremely low number
of individuals who have been provisionally discharged is likely due
467
to the phases’ stringent rule-based compliance systems.
Judge Frank wrote that each of the six reasons is an
independent reason that the MCTA is itself unconstitutional in
468
implementation.
It is clear that the MSOP’s treatment
progression criteria and programming make it extremely difficult
for individuals to progress through treatment. Indeed, in his
closing comments, Judge Frank described the current MSOP as “a
three-phased treatment system with ‘chutes-and-ladders’-type
469
mechanisms for impeding progression.”
D.

Aftermath

Along with the June finding of unconstitutionality, the court
470
set a pre-hearing conference for August 10, 2015. Judge Frank
ordered the parties to submit remedy proposals and called upon
471
other stakeholders to do the same. Many stakeholders attended
472
this meeting including Governor Dayton. Defendants sought
certification for an interlocutory appeal from the district court to
appeal the June 17th decision; that request was denied by Judge
464. Id. at 1152; see supra Section II.C.2.b.
465. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1172 (“[I]ndividuals get stuck in Phase I of
the program, a part of the program where no specific offender-related therapy is
provided, only institutional rule compliance training and preparation for
therapy.”).
466. Id. at 1153, 1172.
467. See id. at 1147.
468. Id. at 1172.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 1178.
471. Id.
472. Chris Serres & Patrick Condon, Gov. Dayton Unveils Possible Reforms to
Troubled Sex Offender Program, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 10, 2015), http://
www.startribune.com/lawmakers-arrive-at-st-paul-courthouse-as-msop-hearing
-begins/321260851/.
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473

Frank. On October 29, 2015, Judge Frank issued his First Interim
Relief Order, which required the following:
a. Defendants must promptly conduct independent risk
and phase placement reevaluation of all current patients
at the MSOP. . . . Defendants must complete these
assessments according to the following time lines:
i. Within 30 days, Defendants shall complete
reevaluations of the six individuals in the Alternative
Program who were designated for transfer to
Cambridge, Eric Terhaar, and Rhonda Bailey.
ii. Within 30 days, Defendants shall submit a detailed
plan for approval by the Special Master for the
reevaluations of the elderly, individuals with
substantive physical or intellectual disabilities, and
juvenile-only offenders. . . .
....
b. If the independent risk assessment for any patient
concludes that the patient should be fully discharged,
transferred, or receive a reduction in custody, the MSOP
must seek the release or reduction in custody of that
patient to the appropriate placement by immediately
filing a petition with the Special Review Board . . . .
c. Defendants must ensure that less restrictive alternatives
are available to accommodate all individuals found
eligible for a reduction in custody. . . .
d. Following each treatment phase placement
reevaluation . . . Defendants shall immediately move any
individual who is determined to be in an improper
treatment phase into the proper treatment phase. . . .
e. Defendants shall establish a plan to conduct annual,
independent risk assessments to determine whether each
client still satisfies the civil commitment requirements. . . .
....
2. Special Master former Minnesota Supreme Court Chief
Justice Eric J. Magnuson shall have authority to monitor
474
compliance with the remedies identified above.
Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal with the District Court
and requested an immediate stay from the October 29th interim
473. Karsjens v. Jesson, No. 11-3659, 2015 WL 4478972, at *4 (D. Minn. July
22, 2015).
474. Karsjens v. Jesson, No. 11-3659, 2015 WL 6561712, at *16–17 (D. Minn.
Oct. 29, 2015) (citation omitted), appeal docketed, No. 15-3485 (8th Cir. Nov. 2,
2015).
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475

relief order pending their appeal. On November 23, 2015, Judge
476
Frank denied Defendants’ request for an injunction. There are
four factors to consider when determining whether to grant a
request for a stay, including: “(1) whether the movant has a strong
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be
irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay
will substantially injure the non-moving party; and (4) the public
477
interest.” Judge Frank acknowledged that the first two factors of
478
this analysis were most important.
Judge Frank did not find within Defendants’ claims a strong
479
likelihood that they would succeed on appeal. He emphasized
that Defendants’ reliance on experts and the expert report did not
480
bolster their claims of likely success on appeal. The court’s
conclusion that the MSOP is unconstitutional was based primarily
481
on testimony from Defendants’ own employees. Judge Frank
found that Defendants did not meet their burden with respect to
482
the irreparable harm that would occur without a stay. Specifically,
he found that Defendants’ right to appeal will not be impacted by
483
denying their request for a stay. Further, Defendants failed to
propose alternative timelines to those set out in the court’s
October 29th order, which would have provided relief from their
484
immediate concerns about logistics and funding.
On December 15, 2015, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
granted Defendants’ request for a stay on Judge Frank’s October
485
29th order. On November 2, 2015, Defendants appealed Judge

475. Karsjens v. Jesson, No. 11-3659, 2015 WL 7432333, at *1 (D. Minn. Nov.
23, 2015).
476. Id. at *7.
477. Id. at *2 (citations omitted).
478. Id. (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)) (“[T]he first two
factors are the most critical.”).
479. Id. at *5.
480. Id. at *3.
481. Id.
482. Id. at *5.
483. Id.
484. Id. at *6 (“By failing to [propose how they could remedy the
unconstitutional infirmities at the MSOP], Defendants have effectively created
their own administrative and financial difficulties by forcing the Court to impose a
remedy in the absence of Defendants’ own detailed input.”).
485. Karsjens v. Jesson, No. 11-3659, 2015 WL 6561712 (D. Minn. Oct. 29,
2015) (citation omitted), appeal docketed, No. 15-3485 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 2015).
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Frank’s finding of the MSOP’s unconstitutionality.
Oral
arguments before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals took place
487
on April 12, 2016.
The Karsjens case demonstrates the inherently difficult task of
balancing sex offenders’ personal liberty and the state’s compelling
interest of keeping communities safe, as this is problematic line to
488
toe. There is only so much a court can do to effect actual change
at MSOP. As cases challenging the constitutionality of civil
commitment systems have made clear, a “win” in this setting does
489
not result in immediate action. As the case of Turay v. Seling
illustrates, system change in a long standing and entrenched
490
unconstitutional SOCC program is difficult to achieve. Change
comes slowly, and the court can only order Defendants to take
action to make changes—the court cannot allocate funds, require
MSOP to hire new leadership, or change public opinion about an
issue that has proven divisive for decades. The court is limited by
separation of powers. The legislature can allocate funding. As
executives, the Governor and Commissioner of Health and Human
491
Services make decisions about hiring and leadership. However,
even given these limitations, a huge step forward for MSOP would
be coming into constitutional compliance—that is, releasing
individuals within the program when their risk level falls below

486. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (D. Minn. 2015), appeal docketed,
No. 15-3485 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 2015).
487. Id.
488. For a look at a former sex offender’s take on civil commitment, see ONCE
FALLEN, http://www.oncefallen.com (last visited Mar. 16, 2016). Derek Logue is
the creator of the website and a former sex offender, and he has been on
numerous national television shows to advocate for changes in policies regarding
the treatment of sex offenders. Id. Mr. Logue, with his endless connections,
including men whom he writes to who are currently civilly committed for sexual
offenses, did not know a single person who had been released from SOCC. He
only knew individuals who are currently civilly committed, which says a lot about
our current system of SOCC. E-mail from Derek Logue, Reform Advocate &
Owner, Once Fallen, to Jennifer Anderson, Author (Nov. 1, 2015, 19:32 CST) (on
file with author).
489. Douglas Smith, The Constitutionality of Civil Commitment and the Requirement
of Adequate Treatment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1383, 1384 (2008).
490. Id. at 1383–84.
491. See generally Bierschbach, supra note 414 (discussing the differential
powers of the federal court, the state, and the legislature on affecting change in
the MSOP).
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492

constitutional thresholds for commitment.
Next, the court’s
recommendations and lessons from Seling are discussed. This
comment then recommends changes that lie beyond the court’s
reach—namely funding, changing the culture within MSOP and
implementing strategies to alter public opinions of sex offenders
and MSOP.
E.

The Court’s Recommendations

The court has the power to order named defendants to take
493
certain actions. The court’s order in this case largely follows the
expert report, a detailed and comprehensive assessment of MSOP
494
by a group of national experts in the field. Like the Seling case,
discussed below, the court’s recommendations focus on providing
adequate treatment to individuals at MSOP that meets
495
constitutional muster. Not only did the expert panel in this case
496
spend diligent time at the facilities interviewing patients and staff,
the panel brings their own expertise—using research and best
497
practices in the field to inform their recommendations. The
report is a road map for change at MSOP—Judge Frank viewed it as
498
The court made sound recommendations relating to
such.
annual evaluations, the process of moving between phases of
treatment, and in requiring that less-restrictive alternatives be made
available immediately to all those individuals who no longer meet
499
commitment standards.
Like the court in Seling, Judge Frank did not choose to order
500
the immediate release of any named defendants. The expert
report in this case advocated for the immediate release of those
501
individuals who no longer met commitment criteria. The experts

492. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1159 (D. Minn. 2015); Expert
Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 5.
493. See generally Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F. Supp. 3d 916 (D. Minn. 2014).
494. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 3–6.
495. See generally Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139.
496. See Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 3–4, 9–10.
497. Id. at 61.
498. Compare Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1149–51, with Expert Report and
Recommendations, supra note 41.
499. See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1176–77.
500. Id. at 1144.
501. Id. at 1151; Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 11,
61.
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focused on four special categories of individuals who may be
502
immediately released or moved into less-restrictive alternatives.
They focused on juvenile-only offenders, patients with severe
mental illness, patients in assisted living, and clients with disabilities
503
in the alternative program, including one female MSOP patient.
The immediate release of certain individuals by the court is likely
not the best way to help those individuals or the communities to
504
which they are returning. Some planning needs to be done to
505
facilitate more releases. In particular, alternative monitoring and
therapeutic services need to be available in communities where
506
individuals are released to help ensure their long-term success.
However, for individuals who no longer meet commitment criteria
and the woman who is housed within the all-male MSOP facility,
their releases should be given the highest priority and should occur
507
as soon as feasible.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
In addition to ruling on the MCTA’s constitutionality, Judge
Frank made recommendations to defendants about what should be
508
done about the MSOP. The court’s recommendations largely
mirror those of the expert report and include: requiring risk
assessments and phase evaluation of all individuals as soon as
possible to determine whether clients meet treatment criteria;
requiring a variety of less-restrictive alternatives; revising discharge
process; and requiring MSOP to take affirmative steps in several
509
critical areas, including affirmatively filing petitions for discharge.
The court also recommended greater oversight to the commitment
process, including a judicial bypass system and qualified training
510
and evaluation of MSOP employees on a regular basis. The
court’s final recommendation was that a special master be
502. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 9.
503. Id.
504. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1144–45.
505. Id.
506. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 6; see also
Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1147.
507. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1151; see also Expert Report and
Recommendations, supra note 41, at 22.
508. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1173–75.
509. Id.
510. Id.
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511

appointed. The court appointed former Minnesota Supreme
Court Justice Eric Magnuson to this role.
A.

Lessons from Turay v. Seling

Other courts have ruled on similar challenges in federal court.
For example, in 1994, Washington State decided the case of Turay
512
v. Seling. There, plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality
513
of the statute, but rather the conditions of treatment. The Seling
case, however, still provides some basis of comparison to assess
Judge Frank’s potential remedies and how successful they might
514
be.
In Seling, the U.S. district court found that Washington’s SOCC
program failed to meet professionally reasonable standards for
515
treatment. The court enjoined defendants to take certain steps to
516
make sure adequate mental health treatment was available. When
the process was slow, the court ultimately appointed a special
517
master to monitor the state’s compliance. After five years and
seventeen progress reports, the court issued a contempt order
against defendants based on their continuing failure to comply
518
with the injunction. The case lingered in the system for fifteen
519
years before the injunction was eventually lifted. This illustrates
the entrenched nature of SOCC programs—and how challenging
court-ordered remedies can be to actually implement. The Eighth
Circuit injunction pending an appeal has put a halt to any initial
steps to implement the court ordered recommendations relating to
520
the adequacy of the MSOP treatment.
B.

Author Recommendations

The court does not have control over funding and hiring
policies that are necessary to affect change in the statutes that
511. Id.
512. Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (W.D. Wash. 2008).
513. Id. at 1149.
514. Smith, supra note 489, at 1384; see also Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1149.
515. See Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1158.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. Id.; JANUS, supra note 376, at 5.
519. JANUS, supra note 376, at 5.
520. Karsjens v. Jesson, No. 11-3659, 2015 WL 6561712 *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 29,
2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-3485 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 2015).
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521

impact MSOP. Minnesota’s Department of Human Services and
the state legislature hold a huge amount of power with respect to
522
They must allocate increased funding to
reforming MSOP.
523
support recommendations from the court. Judge Frank, even
after his initial finding of unconstitutionality, tried to engage state
524
leadership to craft a remedy. These engagement strategies have
proven largely unsuccessful and Minnesota, like Washington in
Seling, may be looking at a long period of protracted litigation, lack
of compliance with the court’s order, and very few individuals
being released.
There are critical steps that could be taken outside of the
court’s order that would impact how sex offenders are treated in
Minnesota—and how the MSOP functions. These strategies
include: allocating funding to support staff and resources to
provide adequate treatment and less-restrictive alternatives; a
change in leadership in MSOP that would facilitate reform in
training and a change in the culture of staff and management
within the facilities; and engaging volunteers and the media to
improve awareness to reframe the public’s perspective about sexual
offenders.
The Governor and Legislature have had several legislative
sessions to address the issues plaguing MSOP during the pendency
525
of the Karsjens litigation. The biggest barrier to making necessary
changes at MSOP is a lack of state funding to support these
526
changes. Currently, the money that the State of Minnesota is
spending on the program is not constitutionally sound. This
problem already costs $120,000 per year per person, but in order to
effectuate needed changes and pass constitutional muster more
527
Specifically, funding is needed to
funding may be needed.
provide staff to conduct regular reviews and to create meaningful,
safe, and well-designed less-restrictive alternatives for individuals
528
who are released. This funding is needed to provide additional

521. See Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1148.
522. See Brandt and Prescott, supra note 11.
523. See id.
524. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1178 (D. Minn. 2015).
525. Brandt and Prescott, supra note 11.
526. See generally Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 7–10.
527. E.g. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 71.
528. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1160; Expert Report and Recommendations,
supra note 41, at 7–8.
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529

resources and staff at the Moose Lake facility. Resources and staff
are also needed within the communities in which individuals are
530
released. However, if individuals were moved to less-restrictive
settings in the community, funding that is now being spent on
housing people within the commitment programs at Moose Lake
531
and St. Peter would be saved .
The Rule 706 Expert Report details some of the challenges
that MSOP has had in finding and retaining qualified staff at its
532
facilities. It notes in its recommendations relating to the Moose
Lake facility in particular, “the near impossible challenge of
recruiting, hiring, retaining, training, and supervising professional
and front line staff for an extremely large facility with a very diverse
533
specialized population in a rural community.” One way to find
and retain qualified staff would be to collaborate with nearby
colleges or universities that have professors or students in need of
clinical supervision hours or internship possibilities. The St. Peter
facility is twelve miles from Mankato State University and the Moose
Lake facility is forty miles from the University of Minnesota Duluth.
Both schools have undergraduate and graduate social work
programs and nursing programs, and Duluth has a medical school.
California’s SOCC program has had success with this type of
534
partnership. There the SOCC
hospital is a partner with both West Hills College-Coalinga
and Fresno City College. Through its psychiatric
technician education program, West Hills College has
provided the hospital with hundreds of graduates over the
course of many years. Similarly, about 400 registered
nurses from Fresno City College have completed clinical
rotation in our hospital. DSH-Coalinga is currently
forming a new partnership with two California universities
535
to create clinical rotations for medical students.
529. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 58.
530. E.g. Kay Fate, Local Officials Concerned About Sex Offender Release Funding,
POST-BULL. (June 15, 2015), http://www.postbulletin.com/news/local/local
-officials-concerned-about-sex-offender-release-funding/article_294ea2aa-6198
-5116-83fa-b16e03a40bd3.html.
531. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 71.
532. Id. at 56.
533. Id.
534. Department of State Hospitals—Coalinga, CA DEP’T ST. HOSPS., http://
www.dsh.ca.gov/coalinga (last visited May 20, 2016).
535. Id.
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Resources and staff are also needed in the communities where
536
This includes hiring additional
individuals will be released.
probation agents trained to work with sexual offenders in the
community. The expert report recognizes that:
Specialized supervision for people who have sexually
offended is necessary because traditional supervision
practices do not necessarily address the high-risk factors
associated with some people who have sexually offended.
For example, traditional supervision officers may not have
received specific training that would enhance their
understanding of the risk factors and dynamics related to
sexual offending, which may impact an officer’s ability to
intervene with or interpret any pre-offense behaviors.
Additionally, it is important to limit the amount of cases
each supervision officer receives in order for officers to
better manage and monitor people who have sexually
537
offended adjustment to the community.
As the Rule 706 Expert Report highlights, funding is also
needed to provide community-based treatment programs and
538
transportation to these programs.
The Expert Report makes specific recommendations with
539
respect to resources, staffing, and training. However, the court
cannot make the Legislature pay for court ordered
recommendations. The court’s proverbial stick is to continue to
bring the Department and MSOP back into court if the
540
recommendations are not met. But like Seling, this back and forth
541
can last for years. Thus far, the leadership at MSOP has not
advocated for this type of funding. A change in culture and
leadership at MSOP may be necessary before the kinds of funding,
resource, and staff changes discussed above become a reality.
One of the most painful parts of the Expert Report was its
542
documentation of the toxic culture that exists at MSOP. This

536. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1175 (D. Minn. 2015); Expert
Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 61.
537. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 61.
538. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1160; Expert Report and Recommendations,
supra note 41, at 71.
539. See generally Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41; see also
Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1160.
540. See Turay v. Seling 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (W.D. Wash. 2008).
541. Smith, supra note 489, at 1411–13.
542. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 52–53; see also
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includes the culture among individuals housed within the program
and employees. The Expert Report documents the hopelessness of
543
both individuals housed there and the staff. None believe that
544
release is possible. The status quo is too entrenched. This needs
to change in order for the program to function in a healthy way.
New leadership is needed. As the Expert Report states in its
conclusion, “[T]here is a great deal of opportunity in Minnesota
545
for political courage.” MSOP needs someone with that political
courage to change this flawed program.
The report finds that in a “healthy” SOCC treatment program,
staff within the program identify individuals who are eligible for
546
release based on treatment criteria. The staff are responsible and
see it as a part of their role to help clients eligible for release to
547
actually be released. The Expert Report also documents the
punitive nature of some aspects of the treatment program that
548
hinder progress. These include punishing people for normal
549
infractions by forcing them to regress in treatment. A better
practice would be to not link non-sexually related behavioral
550
offenses to treatment goals or success. MSOP is supposed to be
551
about treatment and not punishment. Staff must be trained in
552
best practices.
The report documents specific trainings that MSOP staff
553
should receive. These include training to work with specialized
populations, training in current diagnostic criteria consistent with
DSM-5 criteria, training in deviant sexual interests, and training in
554
relevant interventions with problematic clients. Leadership that is
willing to demand up-to-date trainings, all-staff participation, and

Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1151.
543. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 52–53.
544. Id.
545. Id.at 54–56, 79.
546. Id. at 54–56.
547. Id. at 54.
548. Id. at 52.
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. Id.
552. Id. at 52, 54–57.
553. Id.
554. Id. at 41, 54.
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actualize training into practice is necessary to change the culture at
555
MSOP.
New thinking is needed from the top to the bottom. MSOP
cannot change if its leadership does not believe there is a
556
problem. Leadership must address the program’s fundamental
flaws and be willing to implement changes despite reluctance to do
so from the staff and public. Moreover, new leadership may also be
able to engage the public and media in efforts to reshape public
perception.
In addition, public opinion about the release of sex offenders
must shift in order for MSOP to be successful. The public must
accept the release of individuals from MSOP into communities as a
normal part of the program’s trajectory. As local expert Eric Janus
has so aptly pointed out, “sexual predator laws give a loud
557
expression to our collective disapproval of sexual violence.”
One study of public perception of sex offenders found that:
[T]he public is poorly informed about sex offenders . . . .
Specifically, myths of extraordinarily high recidivism rates
and “stranger danger” prevail, and the public appears to
view all sex offenders as posing a similar threat to
communities. These widespread beliefs perpetuate the
development of increasingly restrictive policies as
558
politicians endeavor to serve their constituents.
These beliefs exist despite research and literature, which finds
that most sex offenders “can and do return to the community
559
without engaging in further sexual violence.”
One way to begin shifting public perceptions about the release
of sex offenders is to develop Circles of Support and Accountability
560
(CoSA).
CoSA is a “model of professionally supported

555. Id.
556. See, e.g., D.J. Tice, Tough Thing, Isn’t It, This ‘Due Process’?, STAR TRIB., Feb.
3, 2014, LEXIS.
557. JANUS, supra note 1, at 145.
558. Jill S. Levenson et al., Public Perceptions About Sex Offenders and Community
Protection Policies, 7 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 137, 155 (2007).
559. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 72; see also
Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1159 (D. Minn. 2015). Fewer than four
percent of the public felt that community awareness was more effective than
chemical castration to effect recidivism in Florida. Levenson et al., supra note 558,
at 155. Florida is a state that has released 150 sex offenders from their SOCC
system. Id.
560. See Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 72.
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volunteerism, in which trained community members volunteer to
provide support and an accountability framework to a released
561
high-risk/need sexual offender.” This program consists of two
concentric circles—the inner circle being the released offender
562
and four to six community volunteers. The outer circle is made
up of local professionals (treatment providers, law enforcement,
probation staff, and other personnel) who provide support to the
563
inner circle when needed. CoSA has been effective at reducing
564
recidivism among high-risk offenders. The program also educates
community members about the realities of sex offenders—such as
the affirmation that they can live, work, and contribute without
565
reoffending. This aspect of the program helps dispel some of the
myths commonly held about sex offenders and re-offending.
Some states, such as Wisconsin, have effectively utilized
community notification meetings and other public relations
strategies to assuage public fear and outrage over the release of
566
committed individuals. The benefits of community notification
meetings include providing relevant and accurate factual
567
information to community members as well as the media. In this
format, citizens can be educated on the likelihood of re-offense,
community strategies to prevent sexual violence, and information
about sexual offender civil commitment laws and treatment
568
efficacy. The Expert Report points out, “[a]t a person-to-person
level, community notification meetings provide concerned citizens
with opportunities to interact directly with relevant law
enforcement, DHS, DOC and other professionals who become
known potential contacts should subsequent questions or problems
569
arise after the meeting or after the community placement.”
Often, the media attends community notification meetings and is
able to reach a broader audience by reporting on the facts and
570
information presented at these meetings. Thus, the meetings not

561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 97.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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only provide information to community members, but also serve a
public relations purpose through broader media coverage. In many
states, leadership within the SOCC program regularly interacts with
media and the community to provide accurate information and to
571
help break down fear and stigma.
The media also plays an important role in creating accurate
public awareness about sex offenders.
The media should be enlisted as a partner in educating
the public about sexual abuse through the dissemination
of accurate and research-based information about sexual
violence, sexual perpetrators, and victimization. Rather
than sensationalistic journalism, the public would benefit
from factual information about recidivism rates, the
heterogeneity of sex offenders, the signs and symptoms of
sexual abuse, and the common types of grooming
behaviors used by perpetrators who gain access to victims
572
by using their positions of familiarity, trust, or authority.
The media is very good at inciting fear in the public when it
covers violent and rare cases like that of Dru Sjodin. However, if
the media provided accurate information about the risk of sex
offenders re-offending or the effectiveness of community-based
treatment programs even for high-risk offenders, programs like
MSOP would have a much easier time releasing individuals safely
into communities. The media could be a powerful partner in
Minnesota to begin the necessary shift in public awareness about
sex offenders. A shift in public opinion would also make legislative
change more palatable. Increasing knowledge, sharing accurate
information, and presenting images to the public of sex offenders
that do not shock us are needed in order to begin swinging the
pendulum back to a more balanced place on this issue within the
public sphere.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Karsjens case highlights what happens when a system set
up to protect the public becomes a political tool—one where
public outrage supersedes rehabilitation and due process. The
public’s propensity to react swiftly through punitive legislation to
singular violent crimes does not make sound policy. As discussed,

571.
572.

See id. at 97–98.
Levenson et al., supra note 558, at 156.
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the public responded strongly to violent crimes and criminals—
such as the rape and murder of Dru Sjodin and the case of Dennis
Linehan. Public opinion was inflamed and the Minnesota
Legislature reacted swiftly in the statutory criteria for SOCC and
the way in which the MCTA is implemented. However, the longterm consequences to this rush to action have proven ineffective
and unconstitutional. Having a SOCC system that is
unconstitutional is also harmful to the public and erodes our trust
in due process and fundamental fairness.
We need to right the balance between fear and fairness.
Minnesotans should be horrified to read about the situation at
MSOP that has been revealed through the Karsjens case. There are
individuals who have essentially been in a prison-like facility for
more than twenty years who should not be there. They have been
robbed of their freedom and an opportunity to contribute in a
meaningful way to their communities and families. With the
Karsjens case, the court began to identify the steps needed to bring
our SOCC system back into constitutional compliance.
Thanks to a detailed report by a national panel of experts—the
Rule 706 Expert Report—we also have a road map for broader
change of the sort that cannot be brought about simply by a court
order. This includes a need for additional funding, a change in
leadership at MSOP, and community and media assistance to better
inform the public. Any change will involve multiple stakeholders,
and will take time. But a first step will be the assessment and
possible subsequent release of individuals from MSOP who no
longer meet the statutory criteria for SOCC. This will signal that
change has, in fact, finally come.

